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Abstract 
Evidence regarding the potential mediating effects sequential test presentation has 
upon eyewitness suggestibility is divided. Bekerian and Bowers' (1983) research 
suggested that sequential test presentation reduced misinformation effects, whilst 
McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) results failed to indicate any effect of this 
presentation method. A possible reason for these conflicting results is that the 
respective research groups have used different sets of slides. Bekerian and Bowers' 
(1983) slides appeared to contain more thematic content (i.e., linear content), 
which in turn increased participants' resistance to misleading postevent 
information. Conversely, McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) slides appeared to lack 
this feature (i.e., they are non linear). Therefore, it was suggested that the 
influence that sequential testing had upon misinformation effects was mediated by the 
amount of linear content present amongst the slides used by the previous 
researchers. The present study was designed to evaluate this hypothesis. One 
hundred and twelve participants were assigned to one of four conditions, which 
involved a combination of two critical manipulations: the degree of linearity present 
in slides (linear vs. non linear) and test presentation order (sequential vs. random). 
To simulate a misinformation effect, participants were exposed to both consistent 
(control) and inconsistent (misled) postevent items. The dependent variable 
involved participant's recognition difference performance, which was created by 
subtracting participants' misled item perfonmance scores from their control item 
performance scores. One sample l tests were then used to compare each of the four 
cells recognition difference scores. Any scores which were significantly higher than 
zero were interpreted as being indicative of a misinformation effect. All four of the 
cells' recognition difference scores were in the direction consistent with a 
misinformation effect (i.e., a positive score). However, only one of the cells (i.e., 
the linear-sequential cell) reported a significant misinformation effect. In the other 
three cells, the recognition difference scores were not significantly higher than 
zero, although the non linear-random cell test result was only marginally non 
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significant. This pattern of results was inconsistent with the experimental 
hypothesis. Had this been supported, the two non linear cells would also have 
displayed misinformation effects. Furthermore, results failed to confirm McCloskey 
and Zaragoza's ( 1983) predictions that all four of the cells would experience 
misinformation effects, regardless of test presentation. The misinformation effect 
detected in the linear-random cell, and the trend toward such an effect found in the 
non linear-random cell suggested that the influence sequential testing had upon 
misinformation effects was independent of slide linearity. This pattern of results 
was consistent with Bekerian and Bowers' (1983) hypothesis. The implications and 
validity of these results are discussed. 
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Previous Research 
The Misinformation 
Effect 
In the interval between the observation of a criminal incident and its 
subsequent recollection, eyewitnesses will inevitably encounter information which 
is relevant to this event (Bowers & Bekerian, 1984; Loftus, 1979a). This 
information may come from a variety of sources (e.g., investigating police, fellow 
witnesses, media) and will vary in the degree of similarity it shares with the 
eyewitness' original memory. Some of this subsequent information may be clearly 
inconsistent with what actually occurred. In light of this, it seems pertinent to 
ascertain what effect such inaccuracies have upon eyewitnesses' memories. 
Interest in this question has resulted in numerous studies which have 
attempted to evaluate the impact of inconsistent postevent information. Much of the 
early research concerned with such effects can be attributed to Loftus and her 
associates (e.g., Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus, 1975, 1979a, 1979b). One of 
Loftus' most influential contributions has been the three phase paradigm, a 
procedure first used by Loftus (1977) which is still widely employed almost 20 
years later (e.g., Roediger, Jacoby & McDermott, 1996; Weingardt, Loftus & 
Lindsay, 1995; Wright, Varley & Belton, 1996). During the first phase of this 
procedure, individuals view a set of stimuli which depict a series of events. For 
example, during a series of experiments reported by Loftus, Miller and Burns 
(1978), participants were exposed to a succession of slides which displayed a traffic 
accident in which a car was seen striking a pedestrian. Phase Two involved 
introducing some form of written postevent information. For participants in the 
control group, all of the written information was consistent with what was depicted 
in the slides. However, for participants in the experimental, or misled group, the 
postevent information contradicts one aspect, or critical item, that occurred during 
the first phase. During the Loftus et al. (1978) study, for example, participants in 
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the control group who saw a stop sign displayed in the slides were asked 'Did another 
car pass the red Datsun when it stopped at the road sign?', whereas the misled group 
were asked 'Did another car pass the red Datsun when it stopped at the yield sign?'. 
The final phase of this procedure requires participants to complete a forced choice 
recognition test. During this task participants are presented with a series of target-
distracter pairs. Df this pair, the target or original item refers to the item, 
whereas the distracter refers to the item suggested during the postevent 
manipulation (hereafter referred to as the postevent item). The participants' 
objective is to indicate which of these items they believed they saw in the first phase. 
Results from studies which have employed the three phase paradigm typically reveal 
a misinformation effect . That is, misled participants perform significantly worse 
upon the critical item 1 than their control counterparts (e.g., 8ekerian & Bowers, 
19B3; Bonta & Payne, 1991; Bowers & Bekerian, 1984; Loftus, Miller & Burns, 
19B5; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). 
Whilst the misinformation effect has proved to be an enduring phenomenon, 
considerable disagreement has occurred between researchers who have attempted to 
identify the processes underlying this effect (Belli, 1989; Loftus, Schooler & 
Wagenaar, 1985 ). Numerous theories have been proposed to account for the 
negative effect of inconsistent postevent information. Generally, such accounts can 
be separated according to the role they assign the eyewitness' memory for the 
original item. Memory impairment theories have proposed that inconsistent 
postevent information interferes with the original memory by either replacing the 
original memory (alteration hypothesis) or rendering it inaccessible (coexistence 
hypothesis). Conversely, the misinformation acceptance hypothesis postulates that 
1 It is worth noting that the effect of inconsistent postevent information is specific to 
the critical item it refers to. That is, misled participants do not perform 
significantly worse than control participants for any of the items they were not 
misled upon. 
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misinformation can only affect subsequent recollections if the original memory is 
forgotten prior to the introduction of postevent information. Finally, source 
monitoring theory suggests that misinformation effects occur when confusions arise 
regarding the context in which a particular memory was acquired (i.e., participants 
incorrectly believe they saw the postevent item and read the original item). The aim 
of the following section is to discuss each of these theories in greater detail, before 
introducing more recent research , and finally summarising the pertinent findings. 
Interpreting the Misinformation Effect: Major Theories 
Misinformation Impairs the Original Memory 
As discussed above, both the alteration and coexistence hypotheses supported 
the notion that misinformation reduces participants• memories for the original item. 
Whilst both of these accounts suggest memory impairment, they differ in the 'fate' 
they allocate to the original item upon the introduction of postevent infomnation 
(Loftus & Loftus, 1980). Advocates of the alteration account (e.g., Loftus & Loftus, 
1980) suggested that the original item was replaced in the long term memory store 
by the postevent item. In contrast, supporters of the coexistence account (Bekerian 
& Bowers, 1983; Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983) proposed that the introduction of 
misinfomnation created an additional memorial representation (i.e., the postevent 
item exists alongside the original), which in turn affected the accessibility of the 
original memory. 
The different emphasis each hypothesis places upon the permanence of the 
original memory has profound forensic implications, as each account makes different 
clain1s regarding the veracity of eyewitness testimony once misleading information 
has been provided. From the alteration perspective, memories are irrevocably 
altered by misinformation, and thus once contaminated, are of little use to the 
forensic practitioner (Bowers & Bekerian, 1984 ). The coexistence hypothesis 
offers a more optimistic alternative, as even if postevent information is 
incorporated into the long term store, the original memory still exists, albeit in a 
less accessible form (Bowers & Bekerian, 1984 ). Therefore, the differences 
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between the two memory impairment hypotheses is not only of theoretical interest, 
it also has real life applications. 
The importance of determining which of these accounts was correct led Loftus 
(1979b) to slightly deviate slightly from her previous procedure (i.e., Loftus et al., 
1978). The adaptation occurred in th·a final phase, and involved participants being 
confronted with a three item forced recognition test consisting of the original item 
(e.g., stop sign), the postevent item (e.g., yield sign) and a novel item (e.g., no 
parking sign). During this phase, participants were required to indicate the item 
they believed they saw during the slides, as well as nominating a second item on the 
proviso that their first selection may have been incorrect. Loftus ( 1979b) assumed 
that this 'second guess' was sensitive to coexisting memories (i.e., misled 
participants who selected the postevent item first, should still have 'second guessed' 
the original item). In all three of Loftus' (1979b) 'second guess' experiments, the 
second guess accuracy of the misled participants who initially selected the postevent 
item did not exceed chance. 
A second study which merits consideration in the alteration-coexistence 
debate, was reported by Greene, Flynn and Loftus (1982). During this study misled 
participants received a warning that some of the postevent information 'may have 
been inaccurate' either before or after they were exposed to misinformation. In 
addition to these two groups, there was also a misled 'control' group which received 
no warning. The purpose of providing a warning after the postevent manipulation 
was to allow participants to search their memories for the original item. The 
inclusion of the group warned prior to the misinformation allowed Greene et al. 
(1982) to determine if warnings increased resistance to inconsistent postevent 
information. The only significant difference found between the three groups was that 
the 'before warning' condition had fewer incorrect responses than the control group. 
Whilst this suggested warnings could decrease misinformation effects if they 
preceded postevent information, failure to find a reliable 'after warning'-control 
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difference, coupled with the results from the 'second guess' experiments led Loftus 
and her colleagues to conclude that postevent information altered participants' 
memories irreparably (Greene et al., 1982; Loftus & Loftus, 1980). 
Another study which warrants discussion is that conducted by Loftus' '977). 
In terms of misinformation effect research this study contained a number of 
important differences. One difference involved the choice of the critical item. 
Whereas preceding research (e.g., Loftus et al., 1978) used objects (e.g., road sign) 
as the basis for the postevent manipulation, the postevent manipulation used during 
the Loftus (1977) experiment involved the colour of the pedestrian's shirt. A 
further difference occurred during the third phase of the experiment. In contrast to 
future research which used two test pair alternatives (i.e., postevent item, original 
item), Loftus (1977) included several other alternatives. Loftus (1977) found a 
signitieant amount of cases whereby misled participants reports concerning the 
critical item (e.g., the color of a pedestrian's shirt), displayed a 'blend' (hereafter 
referred to as compromise retrievals) comprising of the original and postevent item 
(e.g., a yellow original item and blue postevent item elicited a 'green' response). 
Such results have since been replicated by Belli ( 1988). The nature of these 
compromise retrievals led Loftus (1977) to conclude that the alteration hypothesis 
was responsible for misinformation effects. From this perspective compromise 
retrievals were seen as being caused by a process in which the alteration of the 
original item (i.e., the postevent item replacing the original) was incomplete, 
resulting in fragments of the original item still existing. The partial existence of the 
original memory resulted in a combination between the postevent and original items, 
hence the compromise retrievals. 
Whilst the studies discussed above seemed to provide support for the 
alteration hypothesis, Loftus and her associates were quick to acknowledge that this 
support was somewhat tenuous (Loftus, 1979b; Loftus & Loftus, 1980). The 
essence of this warning lies in the fact that whilst the discovery of the original 
memory would provide clear support for the coexistence hypothesis, failure to do so 
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provides only suggestive support for the alteration hypothesis. Bearing this in 
mind, neither the blend studies (Belli, 1988; Loftus, 1977) or the warning studies 
(Greene et al., 1982; Loftus, 1979b) can be said to have produced conclusive 
evidence for the alteration account. 
Whilst the discovery of 'blends' may seem to suggest a subtle form of 
alteration, the coexistence hypothesis can also provide an explanation for such 
results. Belli (1988) has suggested that such effects may be caused by the two items 
(postevent, original) reducing each others' accessibility so that neither 
predominates, thereby creating a tendency to select the blend response option. 
Furthermore, since no other research concerning blends has been conducted, it is 
impossible to suggest which of these conclusions is correct. In terms of the warning 
studies, it would be reasonable to conclude that during both the Greene et al. ( 1982) 
and Loftus (1979b) experiments, the original memory may have existed, and that 
its failure to be consistently reported by misled participants was due to external 
conditions which reduced its accessibility (i.e., thereby increasing the postevent 
item's availability). This possibility led researchers to revise experimental 
procedures, so that if the coexistence hypothesis were indeed correct, the original 
memory could be more readily accessed. 
Christiaansen and Ochalek (1983) appear to be the first researchers to have 
revised their experimental procedures for such a purpose. Reasoning that the 
warning used by Greene et al. (1982) was not explicit enough ('some of the things 
you read may have been inaccurate'), Christiaansen and Ochalek (1983) introduced 
a more direct warning. The purpose of this warning was to motivate misled 
participants to institute a more exhaustive search of their memory. The distribution 
of this warning was divided amongst two groups: a biased-immediate condition, whom 
were given the warning directly after the postevent infomnation and a biased-delayed 
condition, which received a warning 45 minutes later. In addition to these two 
groups there was also a group which received no misinfomnation (neutral 
condition), as well as a group which received misinformation, yet no warning 
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(biased). All four of these groups were given a recognition test after viewing the 
slides (i.e., prior to the postevent and final recognition test phases), and were 
excluded from further testing if they failed. This was done to ensure that only 
participants who had originally encoded the critical item (i.e., possessed the original 
item) were included in the final analysis. 
As had occurred in previous studies, participants who received 
misinformation (e.g., biased, biased-delayed, biased-immediate) performed less 
accurately en the critical item, than those who did not (e.g., neutral). However, 
participants in the two biased conditions (e.g., biased-delayed, biased-immediate) 
which received a warning were significantly more likely to respond correctly than 
misled participants who were not exposed to this feature (e.g., biased) 
(Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983, Experiment 2). To ensure participants who 
received the warning chose the original item because they truly remembered it, 
rather than merely responding to demand characteristics (i.e., rejecting the 
postevent item, as the experimenter had warned it was inaccurate), Christiaansen 
and Ochalek (1983, Experiment 3) repeated their procedure, but also warned 
participants in the neutral condition. Contrary to this 'narrative rejection 
hypothesis', results indicated that whilst warnings increased biased performance, 
the warnings did not decrease the neutral conditions' accuracy. On the basis of these 
results, Christiaansen and Ochalek (1983) decided in favour of the coexistence 
hypothesis. 
Further support for the coexistence account was provided by Bekerian and 
Bowers (1983). Using the traditional misled and control groups, these researchers 
also included an additional manipulation. Half of the participants received their test 
slides in random order (as had been the case in previous research), whereas the 
other half received theirs in sequential order. The expected misled-control 
difference was found amongst the random condition, however this effect was not found 
amongst the sequential condition. In applying the principles espoused by the encoding 
specificity principle (cf. Tulving & Thompson, 1973), Bekerian and Bowers 
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(19B3) suggested that this effect was due to the experimental group receiving 
conditions that favoured the retrieval of the original item from memory. That is, 
sequential test presentation matched the conditions the original item had been 
presented in, thereby increasing the accessibility of this particular item. 
Conversely, as the random group were not exposed to retrieval conditions that 
matched those present during encoding, the more recent postevent item was more 
likely to be accessed from memory. 
Building on their previous work, Bowers and Bekerian (19B4) increased the 
scope of their investigation concerning retrieval cues. Essentially this study was 
identical to the previous work conducted by these researchers (i.e., it had both 
sequential/random testing conditions and misled/control participants). However, 
Bowers and Bekerian (19B4) also manipulated the order in which participants 
received their postevent information. That is, half of the participants received their 
postevent questions in chronological order (sequential), whilst the other half 
received their questions in a random fashion. Bowers and Bekerian (19B4) reported 
a replication of their previous results amongst participants who had received their 
postevent questions in random order (i.e., sequential testing eliminated misled-
control differences). However, the effect of sequential testing did not extend to the 
participants who were exposed to sequential postevent questioning. This effect was 
predicted by Bowers and Bekerian (19B4), as they claimed that by presenting 
postevent information in a manner similar to the original event (and in the 
sequential test conditions, similar to the test itself), they had created encoding 
conditions that closely matched those under which the original event had been 
experienced. From this perspective, reinstating the encoding context at the time of 
testing (i.e., sequential testing) would have little impact upon the accuracy of misled 
participants, as these encoding conditions were no longer unique to the original 
memory. 
Both Christiaansen and Ochalek (19B3) and Bekerian and Bowers'(19B3; 
Bowers & Bekerian, 19B4) seemed to have convincingly demonstrated that 
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coexisting memories were created by fX)stevent information. The Bekerian and 
Bowers studies were particularly important in this respect, as they accounted for 
the null results reported by previous investigators (Greene et al., 1982; Loftus, 
1979b}. It was for this reason that , following the publication of these results, the 
coexistence hypothesis temporarily became the dominant explanation of the 
misinformation effect. 
Poor Misled Performance is An Artefact Caused By Response Biases 
This dominance was short lived however, as the validity of memory 
impairment (upon which the coexistence hypothesis is based) was called into 
question when McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) proposed an alternative hypothesis. 
Unlike memory impairment hypotheses, McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) 
misinformation acceptance hypothesis does not attribute poorer misled performance 
to memory deficits caused by inconsistent postevent information. In essence, the 
misinformation acceptance hypothesis is made up of two separate explanations, the 
deliberation explanation, and the non retention explanation (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 
1985; Zaragoza, McCloskey & Jamis, 1987). The deliberation explanation suggests 
that the introduction of inconsistent postevent informotion exposes misled 
participants to demand characteristics (e.g., the assumption that the experimenter 
more likely to remember what was seen, and thus the postevent information must be 
correct). From this perspective, even if misled participants do remember the 
original event, such pressures may cause a large proportion of this group to base 
their response on the more recent (and erroneous) postevent information. The non 
retention explanation suggests that misinformation effects are essentially the cause 
of participants forgetting2 the original item prior to the introduction of postevent 
2 For the sake of brevity, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985)used the terms 
'remember' and 'forget'. However, this does not mean that they have assumed the 
memory trace is completely non-existent, " ... the arguments we developed (and those 
we make subsequently) are unaltered if we assume that subjects can have partial 
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information. Participants in the misled group who forget the original item 
independently of the experimental manipulation, may remember the postevent item 
and base their responses on this erroneous detail. Control participants are not 
exposed to this bias, as ewm if they can not remember the original event, they can 
guess and will be right at least 50% of the time. Based on this explanation, poorer 
misled performance is still expected, even when an equal proportion of individuals in 
control and misled groups remember the original item. By combining these two 
explanations, the misinformation acceptance hypothesis provided a reasonable 
alternative to the notion of memory impairment. 
In order to test the veracity of the misinformation acceptance hypothesis, a 
procedure needed to be developed which was sensitive to the potential impairing 
effects of misinformation, yet at the same time avoided confounding both demand 
characteristics (i.e., deliberation) and differential guessing (i.e., non retention) 
(Zaragoza & McCloskey, 1 989). Research conducted by Weinberg, Wadsworth and 
Baron (1 983) represents the first attempt to balance these two issues. The only 
difference between the Weinberg et al. (1 983) procedure, and the earlier 
misinformation research lay in the forced choice recognition phase each employed. 
Whereas participants in previous studies were confronted with either the original or 
postevent item, the test during the Weinberg et al. (1 983) study consisted of the 
original item and a novel item derived from the same category as the 
original/postevent items. Subsequent authors (e.g., Belli, 1 989; Tversky & Tuchin, 
1 989; Zaragoza & McCloskey, 1 989) have referred to the traditional test as the 
standard test, whilst labelling the Weinberg et al. (1 983) procedure as the modified 
test. The rationale behind employing the modified test is that by replacing the 
postevent item, the influence of response biases (i.e., caused by deliberation and non 
retention) are eliminated, whilst the ability to detect impairment is retained 
memory for original or misleading information" (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1 985, p. 
4). 
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(Weinberg et al.. 1 983; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1 985; Zaragoza & McCloskey, 
1 989; Zaragoza et al., 1 987). That is, if participants memories were affected by 
the postevent information, misled participants would not select the original item on 
the test, thereby replicating previous research. Alternatively, if response biases 
were the underlying factor, there would be no misled-control difference. Results 
from this study indicated z significant misled·control difference, evidence which Jed 
Weinberg et al. (1 983) to conclude that memory impairment, rather than response 
biases were the cause of memory impairment. 
McCloskey and Zaragoza ( 1 985) provided an alternative interpretation of the 
Weinberg et al. (1 983) study, claiming that the choice of test stimuli, combined 
with a failure to counterbalance, biased results. Participants in the Weinberg et al. 
(1 983) study were exposed to the slides originally used by Loftus et al. (1 978). 
Unfortunately, unlike the Loftus et al. (1 978) study, Weinberg et al. (1 983) did 
not counterbalance their items. That is, each participant viewed a yellow yield sign 
and were given a red yield sign as a distracter (th~ novel item). Misled participants 
received postevent information referring to t.his critical item as a 'stop sign', 
whereas the control group were exposed to information which labelled this merely as 
a 'road sign'. Extending the notion of non retention, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1 985) 
contended that participants exposed to inconsistent postevent information were 
subjected to a unique bias: 
Faced with a yellow yield sign versus red yield sign test, it 
seems likely that many of those subjects would choose the 
alternative most similar to the stop sign; that is, the red yield 
sign. Thus, among subjects who did not remember the original 
information, the misleading information may have created a 
bias toward selection of the incorrect test alternative. This 
response bias is simply a milder form of the bias in the original 
test procedure, where the misleading information is identical, 
not merely similar to the incorrect test alternative 
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(McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985, p. 8). 
Using a new set of slides which depicted an office burglary, and allowing for the 
counterbalancing of critical items, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) exposed the,r 
participants to two experimental manipulations. The first of these was the 
traditional postevent manipulation, resulting in two groups; misled and control. The 
second involved the type of recognition test. Half of the sample received the modified 
test (i.e., original/novel items) whilst the remaining participants completed the 
standard test (i.e., original/pcstevent items). Results appeared to be consistent with 
McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) claims, as a significant misled-control difference 
was found only in the standard test condition. 
As previous research (e.g., Postman & Underwood, 1973) had demonstrated 
that recall memory was more sensitive to retroactive interference than recognition 
memory, Zaragoza et al. (1987) reasoned that a failure to detect a misinformation 
effect via recall procedures would provide further suppcrt for the misinformation 
acceptance account. With this in mind, Zaragoza et al. (1987) expcsed half of their 
participants to a standard recognition test, whilst the other half received a cued 
recall test. The switch to recall required these researchers to restructure their 
stimulus materials and test questions so that the inconsistent pcstevent items were 
not correct respcnses to the critical item (cued recall) questions. For example, if 
the original item was a Coke can, the pcstevent item suggested to misled participants 
was a can of Planter's peanuts. The critical test question for this item was 'The keys 
to the desk drawer were next to a soft drink can. What BRAND of SOFT DRINK was 
it?'. By including such a manipulation, Zaragoza et al. (1989) assumed that they 
had developed a procedure that was sensitive to pcssible memory impairment, and 
avoided confounds due to deliberation/non retention. Consistent with the predictions 
made by Zaragoza et al. (1987), results indicated that a significant difference 
between the misled and control groups occurred in the standard recognition group, 
yet not in the recall condition. 
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The results of the McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) and Zaragoza et al. 
(1989) studies appeared to indicate that response biases, rather than memory 
impairment were responsibl~ for misinformation effects. Encouraged by these 
results, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985; Zaragoza & McCloskey, 1989) attempted to 
apply the principles of deliberation and non retention to account for previous 
research findings. From this perspective, results obtained during the 'second guess' 
studies (e.g., Loftus, 1979b) merely reflected non retention. That is, the poor 
accuracy of misled participants' second responses could be interpreted as evidence 
that they never remembered the original item, even prior to the introduction of 
postevent information, and thus could not be expected to 'second guess' above chance 
(McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1 985). Misinformation acceptance was also used to account 
for the 'blend' responses reported by Belli (1988) and Loftus (1977). Zarago?a and 
McCloskey (1989) contended that such responses were the result of a subtle form of 
deliberation which occurred when participants remembered both the original and 
postevent items. In such cases, the assumption that the experimenter was correct, 
caused participants to modify their response in order to reflect compromise between 
the two alternatives. The application of misinformation acceptance has also been 
applied in order to account for the results obtained by 'warning studies'. The notion 
that participants who forget independently of the postevent manipulation can 
certainly account for researd1 in which no effect of a warning was found (e.g., 
Greene et al., 1985), as all the misled groups, regardless of the presence of a 
warning, can be assumed to select the postevent item as they are presumed to have 
trusted the veracity of its source . Such a conclusion becomes a little more 
problematic in Christiaansen and Ochalek's (1983) case, where a warning was used 
to override the initial deleterious effects of misinformation. However, McCloskey 
and Zaragoza (1985) claimed that the warning caused misled participants who did 
not remember the original information (i.e., they either forgot after the initial test, 
or did not remember even at this stage and guessed initially) to reject the postevent 
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information, guess the correct response, and subsequently perform in a manner 
comparable to their control counterparts. 
The only previous findings that can not be adequately explained by the 
misinformation acceptance hypothesis, are those reported by Bekerian and Bowers 
(1983; Bowers & Bekerian, 1984). It is unreasonable to suggest that differential 
guessing/ demand characteristics could be mediated merely by the order in which 
postevent and test items are presented, a fact acknowledged by McCloskey and 
Zaragoza (1985) themselves. This point, and McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) own 
findings regarding sequential testing, will be discussed in greater detail further on 
in this paper. The purpose for discussing the issue at this stage is merely to 
highlight the fact that the misinformation acceptance hypothesis, like its predecessor 
memory impairment, is not without its flaws. Bearing this in mind, it seems 
appropriate to explore subsequent research which contradicts McCloskey and 
Zaragoza's (1985) position. These points can be classified into two main categories, 
the first of which relate the recall procedure developed by Zaragoza et al. (1987). 
The second category is concerned with McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) use of the 
modified recognition test. 
As Zaragoza et al. (1987) have stated, failure to detect misled-control 
differences using the modified recall procedure provided strong evidence against 
memory impairment. However, based on previous research conducted by Loftus 
(1979a), there is good reason to question the validity of Zaragoza et al. (1985) 
results. Loftus (1979a) found that inconsistent postevent information only 
distorted participants' responses when it was credible- postevent items which 
blatantly contradicted what actually occurred did not affect the accuracy of 
participants' subsequent re•:JOnses. The reason for this, Loftus (1979a) contended, 
was that the contradictory nature of the postevent information caused participants to 
detect the disco epancy between the original and postevent items, thereby resulting in 
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the postevent item being excluded from participants' memories3. Further support 
for Loftus's (1979a) notion of discrepancy detection, was provided by Tousignant, 
Hall and Loftus (1 986), who found that misinformation effects were more likely to 
occur amongst those who read the postevent information quickly. The obvious 
implication of these results was that fast readers were less likely to process 
material as deeply as slow readers and thus, less likely to notice the original-
postevent item discrepancy. 
During the Zaragoza et al. (1 987) study, postevent items came from a 
different category (e.g., can of Planter's peanuts) to which the original item (e.g., 
soda can) was derived. In light of Loftus's (1 979a) results, a plausible alternative 
to Zaragoza et al. (1 987) explanation exists. That is, a misinformation effect did not 
occur as the postevent information was blatantly different to what actually occurred, 
and as such was not incorporated into misled participants' memories prior to the 
final test. However, whilst this is a plausible alternative to the explanation offered 
by Zaragoza et al. (1 987), it is unclear if it is the correct explanation, as it has not 
yet been tested. 
The research conducted by Zaragoza et al. (1 987) was not the only study to 
attract criticism, as McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1 985) research which used a 
modified recognition procedure has also been challenged. Contrary to McCloskey and 
3 Whilst Loftus ( 1 979a) believed these results reflected alteration based memory 
impairment, they can be explained by other accounts. The coexistence impairment 
account would also claim that the blatant nature of the postevent information results 
in it being omitted in memory. The essential difference being that, if it was accepted 
by participants, it would be stored (rather than placed over) next to the original 
item. The misinformation acceptance hypothesis makes a different claim- the 
blatant nature of the misinformation causes participants to doubt the credibility of 
the source (e.g., questionnaire), which in turn causes participants to avoid biases 
related to deliberation. 
I 
Sequential Presentation 2 2 
Zaragoza's (1985) findings, there have been some instances in which 
misinformation effects have been detected using modified test procedures. Chandler 
(1989; 1991) is one such reporter who has detected misled-control differences, 
whilst using the modified test procedure. Whilst these results appear to challenge 
the misinformation acceptance hypothesis, it is worth noting that Chandler (1989; 
1991 ), unlike previous researchers used stimuli (e.g., pictures of landscapes) that 
were not forensically related. As such, several authors (Belli, Lindsay, Gales & 
McCarthy, 1994; Belli, Windschitl, McCarthy & Winfrey, 1992) have expressed 
concern regarding the generalisability of Chandler's ( 1989; 1991) findings. 
Misinformation effects under modified test conditions have not been 
restricted to Chandlers' (1989; 1991) work, as some investigators (Ceci, Ross & 
Toglia, 1987; Belli, et al., 1992; cf. Payne, Toglia & Anastasi, 1994) who have used 
forensically relevant stimuli have also detected significant misled-control 
differences. Whilst the presence of such results support the notion of memory 
impairment, and thereby challenge the misinformation acceptance hypothesis, it is 
worth noting that a meta analysis conducted by Payne et al. (1994) found that the 
vast majority (i.e., 30 out of 44 published cases) of studies which have used the 
modified test procedure failed to find misinformation effects. Therefore, any 
explanation that uses some aspect of impairment to account for these significant 
results, must also explain why the vast majority of studies have nor found such 
effects. Whilst several authors have attributed the two different sets of findings to 
recognition performance levels (Chandler, 1989; Payne et al., 1994)4, it is also 
4 Both Chandler ( 1989) and Payne et al. ( 1 994) have suggested that control 
performance affects the magnitude of the misinformation effect. Put simply, in 
order to obtain a significant misled-control difference when using a modified test, 
performance can not afford to be either too high or too low. If it is too high, 
participants will not incorporate the postevent item into their memories. On the 
other hand, if it is too low, participants may still guess the correct item, even when 
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possible that these antagonistic results may merely reflect variations in methodology 
(e.g., sampling error, measurement differences) used by the respective research 
groups (Payne et al., 1994). As little research has examined the effect of 
recognition levels on misled~control differences, it is unclear as to which of these 
conclusions is correct. 
Another criticism of McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1 985) results involves the 
omission of the postevent item from the final test. As has already been discussed, 
their justification for this manipulation was that it avoided deliberation/non 
retention confounds, whilst still remaining sensitive to the potential impairing 
effects of inconsistent postevent information. Whilst such a test may be capable of 
detecting the type of impairment in which the original item is irrevocably altered 
during the postevent phase (ala alteration), several researchers (e.g., Belli, 1 989; 
Tversky & Tuchin, 1989) have contended that the modified test is insensitive to the 
type of impairment in which the postevent and original memories remain together in 
memory (i.e., coexistence). Using the principles outlined by the encoding specificity 
principle (cf. Tulving & Thompson, 1 973), these authors asserted that by 
presenting the original item in the absence of its postevent rival (this is replaced by 
a novel item), test conditions are clearly biased toward the retrieval of the correct 
item. If this was the case, it would be reasonable to expect that the misled and 
control groups would be perform equivalently, even if the misled group's memories 
were impairecP 
their memories are impaired (remember, the modified test does not offer the 
postevent item as an option), and perform at around chance levels. For a more 
detailed discussion of this explanation the reader is directed to Chandler's (1989) 
paper. 
5 Even from a misinformation acceptance perspective, the postevent manipulation 
may not have worked. As McCloskey and Zaragoza (1 985) have acknowledged, 
participants need only to remember seeing a soda can (they don't have to remember 
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Evidence for this alternative explanation have been provided from two 
sources. The first of these was provided by Loftus et al. (1989). Essentially, this 
study was an exact replication of McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) work. The 
independent variables were exactly the same; there was the misled-control 
manipulation, as well as the standard and mcdified test conditions. The defining 
feature was that in addition to recognition performance, participants' reaction times 
were included as a separate dependent variable. In terms of recognition 
performance, Loftus et al. (1989) duplicated McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) 
results (i.e., a misinformation effect occurred only in the standard test condition). 
Regarding the reaction time measure, misled participants did not respond more 
slowly overall. However, the misled group did respond more slowly than control 
participants in the modified condition. Loftus et al. (1985) suggested that these 
slower times were caused by the postevent Items absence on the final test, which in 
turn caused participants to conduct a more exhaustive (and lengthy) search of the 
memory store. 
Caution must be exercised in accepting this explanation, however, as this does 
not represent the only interpretation. Zaragoza and McCloskey (1 989) have also 
proposed alternative explanation which can also account for the Loftus et al. (1 989) 
results. They contended that during the postevent phase, misled participants who did 
not remember the original item were merely acquiescing to biases associated with 
either demand characteristics or non retention. Upon being confronted with the 
modified test, a test in which the suggested item is conspicuously absent, these 
participants would be forced to guess. As this explanation also predicted longer 
if it was a Coke, Sunkist, 7 Up or Sprite) in order to eliminate the effects of 
inconsistent postevent information. Even this level of detail is not required- in 
order to avoid the effects of postevent information, participants merely need to 
remember that the item they saw was not a 'can of Planter's Peanuts', a far easier 
task than having to remember exactly what it was they actually witnessed. 
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reaction times for participants who were exposed to both misinformation and the 
modified test, the Loftus et al. (1989) results could not be used to resolve whether 
or not the absence of the postevent item did indeed interfere with the accessibility of 
the original trace. 
The second piece of research which attempted to address this controversy was 
conducted by Belli (1989, Experiment 2). Like previous research, Bel!i's (1989) 
research contained the familiar control and misled groups. However, the 
distinguishing feature of Belli's (1989) work was the final test; half of the 
participants were received the original item, the other half received a novel item. 
Participants were then expected to indicate via a 'yes' or 'no' response, whether or 
not they had previously encountered the item (so far no one has endeavoured to label 
this the modified-modified test procedure). According to Belli (1989), this 
response format avoided the response biases outlined by McCloskey and Zaragoza 
(1985), as well as being sensitive to impairment related to coexisting memories. 
That is, this technique did not include the postevent item, yet at the same time the 
'no' response allowed misled participants who believed they saw the postevent item 
the chance to express this belief. Analysis revealed that in comparison to the control 
group, misled participants were less likely respond correctly (i.e., a correct 
response being either 'yes' for the original item or 'no' for the novel alternative). 
These results were subsequently replicated by McCloskey and Zaragoza (1989). 
Both Belli (1989), as well as Tversky and Tuchin (1989) claimed these results 
demonstrated that misinformation effects were due to coexistence-based memory 
impairment. Zaragoza and McCloskey (1989) were not so sure. Their 
interpretation suggested that the postevent item merely undermined misled 
participants' confidence in their memories for the original item, which in turn 
caused this group to respond less accurately. 
As can be seen, the misinformation acceptance hypothesis has created a great 
deal of controversy. Overall, it provides a reasonable alternative to the memory 
impairment hypotheses, yet it has not been within its critics. Whilst some 
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researchers (e.g., Belli et al., 1992; Chandler, 1989; 1991) failed to replicate 
previous findings which supported the misinformation acceptance hypothesis, it is 
worth noting that the majority of researchers who have employed modified test 
procedures have decided in favour McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) conclusions. In 
spite of these favourable results, the modified test procedure could be criticised 
either for not being sensitive to memory impairment (Belli, 1989; Tversky & 
Tuchin, 1989), or, as was the case with Zaragoza et al. (1987) using postevent 
items so blatantly contradictory that the effect of the manipulation was nullified. 
However, it is unclear as to whether these criticisms are valid, as in the case of the 
former criticism an alternative explanation exists, whereas the latter criticism has 
not been subjected to scientific analysis. 
Misinformation Effects Are the Product of Source Misattributions 
The final explanation of the misinformation acceptance hypothesis discus;ed 
in this paper relates to source monitoring. Source monitoring refers to the mental 
activity individuals use in order to identify the origin (or source) of internal 
knowledge representations (e.g., memories, beliefs) (Hashtroudi, Johnston & 
Chrosniak, 1989; Johnston, 1988; Johnston, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 
Johnston & Kwon, 1991; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). Central to the theme of source 
monitoring is that this identification is not achieved via an abstract tag which is 
stored alongside the memory itself. Rather, it is proposed that information relating 
to the temporal, spatial and contextual circumstances in which a memory was 
acquired are an inherent feature of the memory itself. During the act of retrieval, 
evaluation criteria are then used to determine the source of the memory. These 
decision making processes are by no means arbitrary. That is, the evaluation 
criteria used to determine a memory's source will vary accorc'ing to the nature of the 
memory task. The distinction made between automatic (e.g., using qualitative 
characteristics from activated memories) and controlled (e.g., retrieving additional 
information for comparison with activated characteristics) processing (Jacoby & 
Dallas, 1981; Johnston & Raye, 1981; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), is one such 
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example of the many different operations brought to bear in order to locate memorial 
origin. Situational factors are an important determinant of the type of source 
monitoring criteria used (Johnston et al., 1993). This point is best illustrated by 
an example provided Johnston et al. (1993) " ... we expect people to be more careful 
[consult many memorial sources using both controlled and automatic processes] 
about the origin of information when they are testifying in court than when they are 
recounting events on a social occasion" (p. 5). 
Source monitoring theory provided a new way of viewing the misinformation 
effect. From this perspective, inconsistent postevent information was believed to 
cause source misattributions (Johnston et al .. 1993 ). In essence, this meant that 
misled participants did not accurately identify the source from they encountered the 
posteventloriginal items, which led them to believe they saw the postevent item, 
rather than actually reading it. In order to demonstrate this principle, Lindsay and 
Johnston (1989a) modified the three phase adopted used previous research designs. 
The modification consisted of presenting the postevent items first, and the original 
items second. That is, participants were required to read material prior to viewing 
slides. For participants in the misled condition, some items in the slide sequence 
contradicted what they had previously read. At the time of testing, participants were 
then exposed to a forced recognition test and required to indicate which items they 
had seen in the slides. Analysis revealed that participants in the misled condition 
were significantly more likely to report postevent items compared to the control 
group. As the inconsistent postevent information was introduced first, such findings 
provided suggestive evidence6 that source misattributions were responsible for 
misinformation effects. 
6The Lindsay and Johnston (1989a) study can be said only to provide suggestive 
evidence, as the principles of non-retention/deliberation can still be applied to 
account for such results. However, subsequent results concerned with the efficacy of 
the 'source monitoring test' argue against this conclusion as they can not be explained 
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As has already been discussed, a claim central to source monitoring theory, is 
that the criteria an individual uses to identify a memory's origin, can influence 
source judgements. Forced choke recognition tests which require participants to 
choose between items that were visually presented (i.e., via slides) and items which 
were previously not encountered (i.e., the distracter slides) have been demonstrated 
to cause participants to base their source monitoring decisions upon familiarity 
(Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980). Be•ring this principle in mind, the 
standard test used by previous researchers (e.g., Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; Loftus 
et al., 1978) represents a difficult task for misled participants, as several factors 
(e.g., recency, salience) may cause these individuals to favour the postevent 
alternative. On the other hand, misled participants who encounter a modified test 
would not be subject to such difficulties, as even if they do not remember what they 
saw (i.e., the original item), they certainly are unlikely to select an item they have 
not previously been exposed to (i.e., the novel item) (Belli, 1989; Johnston et al., 
1993; Tversky & Tuchin, 1 989; Zaragoza & McCloskey, 1989). Thus, the source 
monitoring account does not attribute misinformation effects to response biases (i.e., 
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1 985), rather this explanation focuses upon the criteria 
used to evaluate memories. Furthermore, these criteria are believed to be 
influenced by the circumstances surrounding retrieval. 
by the principles of non retention/deliberation. As will be discussed later, the two 
explanations (i.e., source monitoring and misinformation acceptance) need not be 
considered as being mutually exclusive- indeed one of the claims made by the source 
monitoring perspective is that additional knowledge outside of that contained within 
the memory itself can also inform source monitoring decisions (e.g., 'It could not 
have been Elvis I remember seeing yesterday, as he has been dead for over two 
decades'). From this perspective, the process of deliberation can be viewed as 
legitimate. 
I 
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These claims led researchers (e.g., Zaragoza & Lane, 1994) to predict that 
testing conditions which increased the salience of source monitoring characteristics 
would result in fewer misled-control differences compared to tests which required 
participants to rely upon a familiarity criterion. In order to test this prediction, 
Lindsay and Johnston (1989b) employed the three phase paradigm. The essential 
difference with this study was that half of the participants received a recognition test 
which required them to indicate whether they had seen the item during the initial 
slide phase (the standard test), whereas the other half were expected to identify the 
source of any item they believed they had witnessed before (the source monitoring 
test). A misinfonmation effect was only detected amongst the conditions which 
received the recognition test. When source monitoring decisions were encouraged, 
misled participants correctly categorised postevent items as coming from a written 
sourre. These results have subsequently been replicated by Zaragoza and Koshminder 
(1989). Such findings clearly support the notion that the criteria adopted at the 
time of testing can influence the accuracy of participants' memories. 
The discovery that source monitoring tests could boost memory perfonmance 
led Lindsay (1990) to investigate the effects that external conditions would have 
upon source monitoring decisions. Participants within this study were assigned to 
one of two groups: the easy source monitoring condition or the difficult source 
monitoring condition. Those in the easy condition received inconsistent postevent 
information two days after viewing the slides, minutes before the test, and under 
conditions that differed from those under which they had viewed the slides. The 
difficult condition received their postevent information under very similar 
conditions as well as just minutes after viewing the slides (i.e., two days prior to 
testing). Prior to the final recall test, participants received 'logic of opposition' 
instructions, that is, they were informed that details given in the postevent 
narrative were inaccurate, and should not be recalled. It was reasoned that th's 
warning would cause participants to involve source monitoring criteria amongst 
their memory decisions. Results indicated that most participants in the easy 
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condition avoided reporting details mentioned in the postevent narrative. The 
difficult condition quite often reported these details. These results illustrate that 
source misattributions increase as a function of the similarities between contexts 
under which original and postevent memories are acquired. 
Integrating The Research 
Opinion regarding the mechanisms underlying misinformation effects 
remains divided. Some researchers have attributed this effect to memory 
impairment, which is proposed to be either storage (alteration) (Loftus & Loftus, 
1980; Loftus et al., 1978) or retrieval (coexistence) based. Another alternative, 
the misinformation acceptance hypothesis, postulates that poorer misled 
performance caused by demand characteristics and/or non retention of the original 
item. Finally, the source monitoring account implicates source misattributions as 
being the cause of misinformation effects. 
The majority of the research concerned with the various theories has 
attempted to establish one particular theory's claims as the sole determinant of 
misinformation effects. However, a study conducted by Belli et al. (1994) 
illustrated an important point. This study was identical to the traditional three phase 
procedure, except for two details. The first difference involved the type of test used 
during the third phase. Instead of the usual forced recognition procedure, Belli et al. 
(1 994) required their participants to recall both details which were depicted in the 
slides (consistent), as well as any inconstant details they may have remembered 
(inconsistent). Secondly, in order to avoid response biases, participants were 
warned that the postevent narrative contained some inconsistent details?. When both 
the consistent and inconsistent responses were analysed together, it was revealed that 
original items which were contradicted during the postevent phase were significantly 
7 The Belli et al. (1 994) postevent manipulation served as a within-subjects 
independent variable, with each participant receiving misled and control items on 
the postevent narrative. 
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less likely to be recalled than those that were not. Analysis regarding participants' 
memory for source indicated that many participants reported seeing the postevent 
item (i.e. placed in the consistent column), whilst of those who did recall the original 
item (they were misled upon), many also reported reading this item (i.e., 
inconsistent column). These findings suggest that both memory impairment 
(indicated by fewer overall items being recalled), and source misattribution 
(indicated by participants incorrect source responses) influenced misled-control 
differences. 
The above example is significant in that it suggests that no one theory can 
completely account for misinformation effects. The Belli et al. (1994) research 
indicated that both memory impairment and source misattributions contributed to 
poorer misled performance, however, the principles of misinformation acceptance 
may also operate in conjunction with these processes. Whilst it is possible that 
poorer misled performance may be due to the postevent item either interfering with 
the original item (memory impairment), or being mistaken for the original item 
itself (source monitoring), additional effects may be caused by individuals simply 
not remembering the information and assuming the postevent item is correct (non 
retention)8. Furthermore, some individuals may clearly remember both the 
original and postevent items, be clear regarding their source and yet still report 
BAs already discussed the modified test has been proposed to be insensitive to 
memory impairment (Belli, 1989; Tversky & Tuchin, 1989). Such a test also 
eliminates non retention and deliberation (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985), as well as 
making source monitoring judgements much more easy (Belli, 1989; Tversky & 
Tuchin, 1989). Thus, whilst such a procedure eliminates misinformation effects, it 
does not mean processes such as impairment, deliberation and non retention are not 
important. It merely illustrates that under some conditions, (i.e., when the 
postevent alternative is not made salient), such effects can be avoided. 
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seeing the postevent item (deliberation). Thus, in any given experiment, a 
misinformation effect may be due to each of these processes. The proportion of 
participants who experience each of these process will vary across studies according 
to numerous factors including the type of test (e.g., modified test, source 
monitoring) procedure, the proportion of suggestible participants (i.e., those who 
will acquiesce to demand characteristics) and the type of material which needs to be 
encoded (i.e., less people will be subject to non retention, although not necessarily 
impairment and source misattribution when material is more easily encoded). 
The universal acceptance of one particular theory is unlikely to occur (Gee, 
1994). Evidence is subject to multiple interpretations (Belli, 1989), or suggests 
several different processes operate at the same time (Belli et al., 1994 ). This 
suggests that the misinformation effect is a complex mechanism, which is subject to 
a variety of processes. Bearing this in mind, perhaps the greatest task confronting 
contemporary researchers will not be establishing which theory deserves 
precedence, but rather integrating the vast body of research already concerned with 
the misinformation effect. 
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Chapter 2: An Unresolved Issue: 
The Effect of Sequential Test 
Presentation 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the majority of the misinformation 
effect findings are subject to multiple interpretations (Belli, 1989). However, one 
set of findings which remains unresolved involves the contradictory research (i.e., 
Bekerian & Bowers, 1983 vs. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985) regarding the effects of 
sequential test presentation. Discussion of these conflicting results and their 
theoretical implications is conducted below. 
Sequential Test Order: Conflicting Results. Effects and 'Anomalies• 
Failure to detect a significant misled-control difference using the modified 
test procedure led McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985; Zaragoza & McCloskey, 1989; 
Zaragoza et a\., 1 987) to reject the memory impairment hypothesis in favour of 
their alternative, the misinformation acceptance hypothesis. Prior to criticisms 
which emerged after the publication of their initial paper, McCloskey and Zaragoza 
(1985) certainly presented a strong case. One convincing aspect of their hypothesis 
was that it was able to account for much of the previous research which had been 
concerned with determining which of the two memory impairment hypotheses (i.e., 
alteration, coexistence) were correct. In fact, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) went 
into considerable deUil in applying their results to account for previous detail (e.g., 
Christiaansen & Ocha\ek, 1983; Greene et a\., 1982; Loftus et a\., 1978; Weinberg 
et ·' 1983). 
One finding they could not directly account for was Bekerian and Bowers' 
(1983) research. As noted in the previous chapter, Bekerian and Bowers (1983) 
found that by testing their participants in sequential order, the deleterious effects of 
misinformation were avoided. Such findings are clearly inconsistent with McCloskey 
and Zaragoza's (1 985) position that misinformation effects are caused exclusively by 
processes related to misinformation acceptance. After all, it seems unreasonable to 
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assume that differential guessing and demand characteristics would decrease as a 
function of sequential presentation. This fact was acknowledged by McCloskey and 
Zaragoza ( 1985) themselves: 
8ekerian and Bowers used the original test procedure; for the 
critical test question, the alternatives were the originally seen 
item and the item presented to misled subjects as misleading 
information. As we have pointed out, when the original test 
procedure is used, poorer misled than control performance is 
expected even if misleading information has no effect on the 
subjects' ability to remember (i.e., access) the original 
information. This prediction applies to sequential as well as 
random tests (p. 13). 
This led McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985, Pilot Experiment) to attempt to replicate 
Bekerian and Bowers' ( 1983) research. Like their predecessors, McCloskey and 
Zaragoza (1985) split their sample between two test conditions: random and 
sequential. Both conditions were exposed to the standard test procedure. In addition to 
this, McCloskey and Zaragoza (19B5) went to greater lengths in order to reinstate 
the initial encoding context. Whereas Bekerian and Bowers' (1983) sequential group 
received only the test pairs (i.e., critical and non-critical) during the final phase, 
those in McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) sequential cell received the entire slide 
sequence (i.e., test pairs, as well as single slides that were not being tested). 
Despite, this additional feature McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) failed to find an 
effect of test order. Instead both the random and sequential conditions displayed 
significant misled-control differences. This finding, coupled with McCloskey and 
Zaragoza's (1985) findings regarding their use of the modified test procedure led 
these researchers to label Bekerian and Bowers' (1983) findings as "anomalous"(p. 
14). 
Bekerian and Bowers' (1983) results were significant in that they supported 
the notion that misinformation effects were due to accessibility based ;mpairment. 
I 
I 
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Bearing in mind that subsequent researchers (Belli, 19B9; Tversky & Tuchin, 
19B9) have criticised the modified test procedure as being insensitive to such kinds 
of memory impairment9, McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) dismissal of Bekerian 
and Bowers' (1983) results appears somewhat premature. Given the theoretical 
implications of these effects, it is somewhat surprising that subsequent research has 
not endeavoured to identify a more systematic explanation for the conflicting results 
reported by the two groups of researchers. In fact, McCloskey and Zaragoza's (19BS) 
paper represents the most recent explanation of the association between test order 
and misinfonmation effects available amongst the published literature. As such, 
research concerned with investigating the source of this discrepancy is long overdue. 
A Possible Resolution 
Numerous studies have suggested that events which have logically progressing 
themes (i.e., causal links between actions) and central items (i.e., items important 
to the meaning conveyed in the slides) are more likely to be remembered than events 
which lack these features (Black & Bower, 1979; Haberland!, Berian & Sanderson, 
1981; Murachver, Pipe, Gordon, Owens & Fivush, 1996). Therefore, an 
alternative explanation for these conflicting results could lie in the respective 
studies' use of stimuli which possess different amounts of thematic content. 
Bekerian and Bowers' (19B3) slides depict an event which has both a clearly 
progressing or linear theme (e.g., car approaches an intersection, car stops, car 
runs over someone). Conversely, it is not so clear as to whether McCloskey and 
Zaragoza's (1985) slides possess these features, as the actions depicted during their 
scenes are somewhat arbitrary, with the burglar's movements throughout the scene 
having no real logical sequence. The term non linear is applied to slides which 
possess this feature. 
According to Bekerian and Bowers ( 1983) slide linearity is essential, as it is 
the reinstatement of the theme created by sequential test presentation which acts as a 
9 These criticisms have already been discussed in detail, in the previous chapter. 
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retrieval cue 1 hence the decrease in misled~control differences amongst this 
condition. 
Extracting thematic information will ensure that the slide series 
is perceived and understood as a coherent, intelligible story. Thus, 
the sequential nature of the slides provides important global 
information that would be encoded along with the finer details in 
the individual slides. If the slides were then presented in a random 
order at test, the thematic cues would not be explicit in the 
retrieval environment. This could have the effect of forcing 
subjects to use a retrieval strategy that will not be optimal for 
accessing the original memory (p. 140). 
As it is not clear if McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) slides shared this feature, it is 
quite possible that the absence of thematic infonmation was the reason behind 
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) obtaining results which were antagonistic to those 
reported by Bekerian and Bowers (1983). Put simply, whereas Bekerian and 
Bowers' (1983) participants encountered slides which allowed them to encode 
material thematically, and thus benefit from thematic presentation, McCloskey and 
Zaragoza's (1985) slides lacked this feature. As such, McCloskey and Zaragoza's 
(1985) participants would not have encoded material in a manner which was 
conducive to sequential testing. 
The present study was designed to examine the possibility that differing 
levels of thematic contact mediated the effect of sequential testing and hence resulted 
in the conflicting results reported in previous research (i.e. Bekerian & Bowers, 
1983; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). In order to test this hypothesis a procedure 
in which participants were exposed to (a) both consistent and inconsistent postevent 
information (b) either random or sequential testing, and (c) differing levels of 
thematic content (i.e., linear vs. non linear) needed to be developed. Whilst the first 
two of these objectives (i.e., postevent information, test presentation) was achieved 
easily enough, the manipulation of thematic content required innovation. It was 
Sequential Presentation 3 7 
decided that·this effect could be produced by presenting the Bekerian and Bowers 
(1 9B3) in random order during the first phase of the experiment. The random 
presentation would eliminate the thematic cues present amongst these slides, thereby 
creating the non-linear effect required for this experiment. Thus, thematic content 
was manipulated by the order slides were presented in during the initial phase. 
These were presented either sequentially (linear) or randomly (non linear). 
A weakness inherent in employing Bekerian and Bowers' (19B3) slides 
exclusively throughout all conditions, was that the thematic content of McCloskey and 
Zaragoza's (19B5) slides would not be directly evaluated. Therefore, if the effects of 
linear/non linear presentation were found to interact with test presentation, it could 
be argued that such a result represented only suggestive evidence for the proposition 
that McCloskey and Zaragoza's (19B5) stimulus materials were the cause of their 
null results. That is, as McCloskey and Zaragoza's (19B5) slides were not used, it 
could be claimed the linearity of these slides had not been established. However, it is 
the author's opinion that this disadvantage was outweighed by the advantage of such a 
procedure, as using McCloskey and Zaragoza's (19B5) slides may have confounded 
results. Bekerian and Bowers (19B3) slides sequence consisted of 25 slides. 
McCloskey and Zaragoza (19B5) on the other hand, used a sequence of 79 slides. Had 
both sets of slides been used, it could have been argued that failure to find an 
interaction between slide type and test presentation may have reflected the two slide 
groups (linear vs, non linear) having to encode different amounts of material. This 
effect could not be avoided by shortening the McCloskey and Zaragoza (19BS) slides, 
as removing slides would then alter the stimulus materials, thereby making general 
conclusions difficult. By exposing all of the conditions to Bekerian and Bowers' 
(1983) slides this confound was eliminated from the study. Thus, if McCloskey and 
Zaragoza's (19BS) slides had been used, a difference found between the two slide 
types could only be interpreted to mean that some general aspect of the slide 
conditions (e.g., different amounts of slides) affected this result. By using Bekerian 
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and Bowers' (1983) slides exclusively, the affect of linearity was able to be 
manipulated directly, thereby avoiding this criticism. 
During this chapter, the reader has been exposed to various explanations 
regarding the effects of sequential testing. By evaluating the effect that 
misinformation has upon participants exposed both to varying levels of thematic 
content (linear vs non linear) and test presentation order (sequential vs random), 
each of theses hypotheses could be tested. The first hypothesis was provided by 
Bekerian and Bowers (1983). A simple application of their findings would predict 
an interaction between presentation order and misled-control performance 10, that 
is, misinformation effects will be absent from sequential test conditions, 
irrespective of slide linearity. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) proposed that 
sequential test effects were negligible. If McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) 
conclusion was correct, only differences between misled and control performance 
should be found. From this perspective, misinformation effects will occur across all 
conditions, regardless of slide linearity or test presentation. An alternative to this 
conclusion is the experimental hypothesis which will be tested for the first time in 
the present experiment. This proposes that the effects of sequential testing are 
contingent upon the linearity of the slides used by researchers. If the experimental 
hypothesis is correct, it would be expected that an interaction between misled-
control performance, slide type and test presentation order would be found. 
10 Given the more recent findings reported by McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985), this 
pattern of results does not appear as probable as those predicted by either the 
experimental hypothesis, or McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) themselves. 
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Chapter 3: Method 
Research Design 
Participants were exposed to three independent variables during this study. 
The first of these involved the type of slides participants were exposed to during the 
initial encoding stage (i.e., phase 1 ). Half the participants received their slides in 
sequential order (the linear group) whereas the other half received their slides in 
random order. The second variable involved the type of test presentation. Once again 
this manipulation was split equally amongst the sample, half were tested in 
sequential order (the sequential group); the other half were tested in random order 
(the random order). The combination of these two variables created four cells: 
linear-sequential, linear-random, non linear-sequential, non linear random. 
The third independent variable involved exposure to postevent information. 
This served as a within-subjects variable, with each participant being exposed to a 
control item, as well as a misled item. The dependent variable was based upon 
participants' correct responses upon the recognition test. 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 1 1 2 adults. Of this sample, 38 were university 
students. The remaining 74, were members of the public who were recruited 
through various community services (e.g., slimming clubs), sporting associations, 
and social networks. Participants were tested in groups of one, three, four, five, 
six, 12 and 16. Whilst every attempt was made to ensure that participants were 
randomly assigned to the four respective cells, in the interests having equal numbers 
within each cell, the group numbers often dictated which cell they were allocated. 
For example, if one condition required a group of three to compete it, and these exact 
numbers were present, they were placed in this cell. Thus, the procedure regarding 
group assignment is probably best described as being 'quasi random'. 
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Apparatus 
Two slide projectors and related equipment (e.g., interval timer, infra red 
remotes, slide carousels), a set of slides and test booklets were used during the 
experiment. 
S!kLe.> The set of slides consisted of ZS slides, which depict a traffic accident. 
During the slide sequence, two pedestrians are seen walking along a footpath. Upon 
attempting to cross the road one of these pedestrians is struck by a red Datsun. In the 
ensuing scene, the driver of the Datsun emerges from the car, a police car arrives, 
and the driver of the Datsun can be observed fleeing the scene. 
Included within these slides are a set of test slides which include alternative 
versions of the same event. These test slides can be split into two categories: the 
critical item pair, and the non critical pairs. The difference between these two 
categories involved whether they were discussed during the postevent manipulation. 
The critical item was referred to during this phase, whereas the non critical pairs 
were not. Whilst the inclusion of the critical item should by now be apparent (i.e., it 
is the means by which misinformation effects are measured), the purpose of the non 
critical items was less clear cut. Essentially, they were included in order to serve as 
distracter pairs. That is, it was reasoned that by embedding the critical items 
amongst these other test pairs, participants would be less likely to realise the 
importance of this particular item, and therefore would be less likely to succumb to 
demand characteristics. 
Essentially, the slides used for this study were identical to those used by 
Bekerian and Bowers (1 9B3). However, for the purposes of this investigation, it 
was deemed necessary to alter several features of these slides. The first difference 
related to the critical item. This particular item involved a road sign at an 
intersection (Slide 1 0), with the two possible alternatives being either a stop or 
giveway sign. Unlike Bekerian and Bowers (1 983) during which misled-control 
differences were assessed between-subjects, this study treated the postevent item as 
a within-subjects variable. Hence, the creation of a second critical item was deemed 
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necessary. During the accident in depicted in the slides, an observer in a green Ford 
can be seen driving past during two of the slides. The color of this car was changed via 
computer manipulation to yellow (slide 18). This formed the basis of the second 
critical item, with their now being two alternatives: yellow car and green car. The 
manipulation of the car's color was expected to be an effective vehicle for 
misinformation, as previous studies reported significant misled-control differences 
when critical item alternatives were distinguished by color (Loftus et al., 1978; 
Tousignant, Hall & Loftus, 1986). Computer manipulation was then used to remove 
this car from the second slide it appeared in (slide 19), to ensure that participants 
were given only one chance to encode 11 this item. 
The second difference related to the non critical pairs. Unfortunately, the set 
of slides obtained for this study did not include the non critical items Thus, further 
computer manipulation of the slides was required in order to produce them. These 
modifications involved the removal of the companion's watch (slide five), a no 
parking sign (slide nine), the companion as she leant upon a light pole (slide 12), as 
well as the removal of bore tap connection (slide 21 ). The final pair was created by 
adding a poster onto a building which appeared in the background of one of the slides 
(slide six). 
Test booklet The test booklet consisted of eight pages, which can be viewed in 
Appendix A. The first of these pages contained issues regarding infonmed consent. The 
following two pages contained the first of two filler tasks. The fourth and fifth pages 
formed the basis of the postevent manipulation, consisting of a series of 20 questions 
which related to the slides participants had seen. The control-misled questions 
occurred at number 13 and 17. Question 13 related to the car critical item, whereas 
question 17 related to the road sign. Participants who received the car as a control 
11 It was necessary to guarantee that the car critical item only appeared once in the 
slide sequence, as two exposures to the same item may have made participant's 
memories more resistant to inconsistent postevent information. 
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item were asked 'Was there anyone leaning out of the car that passed the accident 
scene?'. This question was essentially the same for participants who were misled 
upon this item, except that the color opposite to that which was depicted in the slides 
was inserted in front of the word 'car' (e.g., for those who saw a yellow car, the word 
'green' appeared in the question). Participants who served as controls on the road 
sign item were asked 'Did a pedestrian 12 walk in front of the red Datsun when it was 
stopped at the road sign?'. Those who were misled upon this item received the same 
question, except that the term 'road sign' was replaced by the item opposite to that of 
which they had seen during the slide sequence (e.g., if they saw a stop sign, the word 
'giveway sign' replaced the word 'road sign in the questionnaire). It is worth noting 
that in both question 13 and 17, inconsistent information was peripheral to the 
answer. That is, perticipants were not asked directly about which color car or road 
sign they viewed. Work conducted by Loftus (1979a) suggested that items which 
allowed participants to actively scrutinise the inconsistent postevent information 
resulted in negligible misled-control differences. It is for this reason that questions 
13 and 17 were designed in this manner. 
The sixth and seventh pages contained the second filler task. The final page 
was included to allow participants to record their responses upon the final 
recognition task. This form consisted of two columns ('Left' and 'Right'), and five 
rows. The rows corresponded to the five test pairs, whilst the columns related to the 
two alternatives for each of test pair. 
Procedure 
The procedure employed during this study followed the basic outline of the 
three phase paradigm originally utilised by Loftus et al. (1978). During the first 
phase participants were seated and given instructions, and then exposed to the slide 
12for the duration of this study, the pedestrian who avoided being struck by the car 
is referred to as the companion, whereas the person who was struck is referred to as 
the pedestrian. 
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sequence. Instructions informed participants that the experiment was concerned with 
'visual and verbal intuitions about memory', as well as communicating the need for 
participants to pay strict attention. It was also explained that the slides were made in 
the United States, and as such vehicles would appear on the right hand side of the road. 
As has already been discussed, participants in the linear condition received their 
slides in sequential order. Those in the non linear condition viewed a random 
sequence. The critical items participants received during this phase were split 
equally amongst each cell; half viewed a stop sign and green car, whereas the other 
half were exposed to a giveway sign and yellow car. Slide images appeared on the left 
hand side of the projector screen, and were presented at a rate of four seconds. 
After completing this task, participants attempted the first filler task. After 
spending 10 minutes attempting the filler tasks, participants moved on to the 20 item 
questionnaire (phase two). The road sign and cars served equal amounts of time as 
control and misled items. That is, half of the participants in each cell were misled 
upon the car item, and received neutral information for the road sign, whereas this 
process was reversed for the other half. Upon finishing these questions participants 
then carried out another 1 0 minute filler task, after which they progressed the 
forced recognition test (phase 3). During this phase participants the 2S slide 
sequence was presented via the left overhead projector again. For 7 of these slides, an 
accompanying slide was presented from the right hand side (i.e., the five non critical 
and two critical items). The sequential conditions had their 18 single slides and 7 
test pairs presented sequentially. Those in the random conditions received the 18 
slides and 7 test slides in random order. With respect to the critical items a standard 
test procedure was used, that is, the item suggested during the postevent manipulation 
was included as an alternative to the original item. For each of these seven pairs 
participants were instructed ascertain which of these alternatives they had 
previously seen and mark this in the corresponding column (i.e., Left or Right). The 
correct slides (i.e., those seen during phase one) were distributed randomly to either 
the Left or Right hand sides. Prior to the test commencing, participants were 
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informed that if they could not remember which of the two test pairs they saw, they 
were required to guess. After completing this test phase, participants were debriefed. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Scoring 
Three aspects of the final test phase were scored in order to allow further 
analysis. The first two aspects were related to the participants' recognition 
performance for the two critical items. These formed two separate categories, 
misled performance and control performance. A score of one was assigned to correct 
responses, whereas incorrect responses were given a score of zero. The final aspect 
that was scored involved participants' performance upon the five non-critical item 
test pairs. The amount of correct responses was divided by five, in order to yield a 
proportion correct score. 
Screening 
Prior to the analysis, misled item performance, control item performance 
and non-critical item performance were examined using SPSS For Windows for 
accuracy of data entry and missing data. Analysis confirmed that there were no 
missing values, so all 112 participants' responses were included within the 
analysis. Whilst misled and control performance were discrete variables, the non 
critical item performance consisted of interval data. As such, participants' non 
critical item performance were screened regarding the assumptions of normality and 
homogeneity of variance. A check of both the stem and leaf plots and skewness and 
kurtosis values (i.e., -.082 and .01 1 respectively) combined with the results from 
the Kalmogorov-Smirnov test, 0(1 1 2) = .227, I! =.000, revealed that the 
distribution of scores were moderately skewed in a negative direction. An attempt to 
transform the data using the square root transformation option on SPSS For 
Windows, resulted in the non critical scores becoming positively skewed (i.e., the 
skewness and kurtosis values were .024 and -.036 respectively, Q(1 12)= .231, 11 
= .000). As the homogeneity of variance was satisfied, [(3, 1 1 2) = 1.024, 11 = 
.385, and cell sizes were equal, it was decided to analyse the untransformed non 
critical data. 
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Analysis 
Overall Analysis of Misled and control item performance Participants' 
critical item performance scores was analysed by both a split plot Analysis of 
Variance and loglinear analysis. As the use of an ANOVA upon dichotomous data is 
controversial, and the results from both of these analyses were essentially the same, 
only the loglinear analysis is discussed in this section. The results from the ANOVA 
are discussed in Appendix B. 
Participants1 misled and control item performance represented discrete 
variables and as such parametric tests could not be used to analyse this data. 
Loglinear analysis was an alternative technique which allowed relationships between 
the type of slides (i.e., linear, non-linear), test order (sequential, random) and 
misled-control recognition performance to be assessed. In order for these 
relationships to be analysed, it was necessary to collapse misled item performance 
and control item into one between-subjects variable 13. During this procedure, a 
new scoring criteria had to be developed. This involved calculating a difference score 
to represent control and misled item performance. Participants who were correct 
for the misled item and incorrect upon the control item were given a score of 
negative one. Conversely, those who were correct for the control item yet incorrect 
on the misled item were given a score of one. Participants who were either correct 
or incorrect on both the misled and control items were given a score of zero. 
Descriptive statistics for the four cells' misled item performance, control item 
performance and the new variable, recognition difference, are provided in Table 1. 
13Unlike the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), log linear analysis can not analyse 
within-subjects data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). As misled and control 
performance was obtained via repeated measures, it was necessary to collapse these 
two variables so that they resembled between-subjects data. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics Regarding Performance on Misled and Control Items. And Mean 
Difference Between These Two Scores 
Group Control Item 
M_ SQ 
Non-linear-Random .75 
Non-linear-Sequential .64 
Linear-Random .68 
Linear-Sequential .71 
Note: n = 28 
.44 
.49 
.48 
.46 
Misled Item 
M SQ 
.54 
.54 
.39 
.so 
.51 
.s 1 
.so 
.s 1 
Difference 
M SQ 
.21 
. 11 
.29 
.21 
.57 
.68 
.66 
.63 
The means displayed in Table 1 indicate that the difference between these two 
scores in each of the four cells were consistent with previous misinformation 
research (i.e., misled performance is worse than that on control items). It is also 
interesting to note that, contrary to the experimental hypothesis, participants in the 
non-linear conditions tend to have performed better than their linear counterparts 
in terms of misled item performance. 
Using the SPSS LOGLINEAR program, a stepwise loglinear analysis with 
backward elimination was requested. The objective of such analysis is to develop a 
model which can provide the best description of the data, whilst using the simplest 
combination of variables to do so. The selection of variables for this model involves 
the systematic testing of components in order to remove any which do not 
significantly contribute to the model's explanation of the variance. The end result is 
a model which is as simple as possible whilst still adequately fitting the data 
(Farnhill, 1 993; Norusis, 1 990; Tabachnick & Fiddell, 1 996). 
The three categorical variables analysed by this model were slide type (S), 
test presentation (T), and recognition difference (D). The data are shown in a 2 x 2 
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x 3 cross-classification table (see Table 2). As mentioned above, the model selection 
process involves comparing orders of complexity until the simplest model is found. 
Any model which retains higher order effects by necessity implies that lower order 
effects are also involved, although some of these lower order effects do not have to be 
themselves significant (Farnill, 1993).During the present analysis there were 
three levels of complexity, the main effects, the two way interactions and the 
threeway interaction . 
Table 2 
Cross Classification of the Frequencies of Recognition Difference Scores At Each Level 
of the Slide Type and Test presentation Variables 
Slide Type Control No Misled 
Worse Difference Worse 
- 1 (0) ( 1 ) 
Non linear 
Random 2 6 14 
Sequential 2 8 12 
Linear 
Random 2 4 16 
Sequential 2 8 12 
In the third order model, the effects tested that were included were all the 
possible threeway and two way interactions., as well as the main effects 
In£ =9+..\.S +AT +AD +,\.ST +A5D +).TD +,\.STD 
This third order model was compared with the second order model, which omitted the 
three way interaction, 
In E =9+..\.S +.tr MD ;.l,sT ,)so io\rD 
The change in fit statistic, the likelihood-ratio change chi square statistic was not 
significant,~z(2)= 1.1 08, I!= .S75. Thus, the threeway interaction did not make a 
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meaningful contribution to the model's predictive ability. The next step of the 
analysis involved comparing a model which had each of the two way interactions, 
with a model which included only some of these two way interactions. Removal of the 
interaction between slide and test did not significantly reduce the model's adequacy of 
1 
fit, X(2) = .001, ll = .969. Removal of this association made intuitive sense, as the 
distribution of the slide type and test presentation variables was determined by the 
experimenter assigning participants to these conditions. Thus, the new model 
consisted of the following effects 
In E =95 +.h +.}.p +ND Jso 
This model was then compared with the model in which the interaction between slide 
type and recognition difference was deleted 
In E =B +:>.s +')J AD +')a-D 
.. Once again, this did not reduce the model's accuracy,X(Z) = .665, ll = .717. The 
next comparison involved the removal of the main effect of slide type. This resulted 
in the following model 
In E=9+~ +AD +'ATD 
2. 
The removal of slide type did not reduce the model's predictive ability,X:(l) = .000, 
f.l = 1.000. This model was then compared with the model in which the interaction 
between test presentation and recognition difference was removed 
In E=lh~ +').o 
1 
The likelihood-ratio chi square test was not significant, X. (2) = .826, ll = .662, 
indicating that the removal of the interaction between test presentation and slide type 
did not contribute to the model's predictive qualities. 
The next comparison involved the deletion of the test presentation variable 
In E=9+W 
t 
The removal of test presentation did not reduce the model's predictive ability,X(l) 
= .000, ll = 1.000. The final step involved comparing the model in which the main 
effect of difference was kept in the model against the zero order model. 
In E=9 
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The likelihood-ratio change statistic was significantJs(2) = 35.882, I! =.000, 
indicating that deletion of the variable, recognition difference, would result in a loss 
of the model's predictive ability. The model had a likelihood ratio of.fi.
2(9) = 2.600, 
11 = . 978, indicating a good fit between the observed and expected frequencies. Both 
the parameter estimates and .z scores for the three way, two way and main effects are 
provided in Table C1 (see Appendix C). It is worth noting that SPSS LOGLINEAR 
reports parameter estimates by single degrees of freedom (Norusis, 1990; 
Tabachnick & Fiddell, 1996). As such, there are (k-1) parameters for the main 
effects, (k·1) (k-1) parameters for the two way interactions and (k-1) (k-1) 
( k-1) parameters for the three way interactions. This means that the last category 
for each variable is redundant, and therefore not included within the SPSS output. 
The loglinear analysis demonstrated that the only variable required to 
produce a model which could account for the observed frequencies was recognition 
difference. The other two main effects, slide type and test presentation did not 
significantly enhance the model's predictive capabilities. Furthermore, none of the 
three way or two way interactions added significantly to the model's predictive 
power. As can be seen in Table 2, there was over representation of the 'misled 
worse' (1) scores in each of the four cells. Such scores are indicative of a 
misinformation effect. 
Sgecifjc Analysis of Misled and Control Item Performance Despite the non 
significant three way interaction, it was decided to conduct specific comparisons 
amongst the four cell means. Whilst conducting comparisons without a significant 
interaction effect is contentious, Howell (1997) has noted that such a result is not 
required in order to conduct post hoc comparisons. Howell's (1997) rationale for 
adopting such a position is twofold. Firstly, omnibus tests tend to distribute 
between-groups variance, making the detection of specific effects more difficult. 
Secondly, post hoc tests were designed without any concern for the statistical 
techniques which test for omnibus significance. As such, Howell (1997) has 
questioned the rationale of relying upon significant omnibus test results to justify 
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post hoc comparisons "If you accept the position that typical multiple-comparison 
procedures do not require significant overall E. then you will examine group 
differences regardless of the value of that E. Why, then, do we even need that E. 
except to provide a sense of closure? The only reason I can think of is 'tradition', and 
that is a powerful force" (p. 351 ). This argument provided the rationale for 
specific comparisons to be conducted, as it was decided that a separate examination 
regarding the magnitude of misled-control differences within each the four cells 
(i.e., recognition difference) would allow the effects of test presentation and slide 
type to be tested more specifically. 
Using SPSS For Windows, one sample t tests were conducted on each of the 
four cells' recognition difference scores. The test value was set at zero. Recognition 
difference was significantly higher than zero in the linear-random cell, t (27) = 
2.295, l.l =.030. Recognition difference in the linear-sequential, !(27) = 1.800, l.l 
= .083; non linear-sequential, t(27) = .827, l.l = .415; and non linear-random, 
!(27) = 1.996, l.l = .056 cells were not significantly greater than zero. However, 
as can be seen the non linear-random cell only just failed to approach significance. 
Using the formula outlined by Howell (1997), a power analysis was conducted. This 
analysis revealed that the test had a 72% chance 14 of detecting a moderate (0.5) 
effect (cf. Cohen,, 1990, 1992). As a check of the normality assumption revealed 
that the recognition difference scores were moderately skewed (i.e., the skewness 
and kurtosis values were -.191 and -.578 respectively, Q(l12) = .306, l.l = 
.000). It was for this reason that each of the four cells' misled and control scores 
14 Cohen (1990, 1 992) recommends power of around 80%. Whilst the present 
study did not achieve this level of power, it still was reasonably high. Indeed, when 
one considers that a power analysis conducted by Rossi, Rossi and Cotterill (in press, 
cited by Cohen, 1990) upon 142 published studies revealed that the median power 
amongst this group was worse than chance (.44), the level of power in this study 
appears remarkably high. 
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were analysed using the non parametric Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. These pattern 
of results were the same as the parametric test results. For a more detailed 
discussion of these results, the reader is directed to Appendix D 1 s. 
Non critical item performance The final set of data subjected to analysis were 
participants performance on each of the five non critical item pairs. Descriptive 
statistics of each of the four cells' performance are presented in Table 3. As can be 
seen in Table 1, non critical item performance was highest in the linear-sequential 
group, followed by the non linear-random, linear-random and non linear-sequential 
cells respectively. 
Table 3 
Participants' Non Critical Item Performance 
Group 
Non linear-Random 
Non linear-sequential 
Linear-random 
Linear-sequential 
~n~28. 
Non Critical Item 
.607 
.586 
.600 
.693 
.207 
.180 
.231 
.228 
1 5 It is realised that by reporting the parametric test results in the main body 
rather than Appendix D the author has broken the precedent set in the reporting of 
the overall analyses (i.e., the non parametric, loglinear analysis, was reported in 
the main section, whilst the parametric test was reported in Appendix 8). However, 
as the author was unable to find a formula that would allow the power of the non 
parametric tests to be conducted, it was decided to report the parametric tests in the 
main body. 
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Using SPSS For Windows, participants' non critical item scores were 
analysed using a 2 x 2 Factorial ANOVA. The independent variables were slide type 
and test presentation. Results indicated that there were no significant main effects, 
slidetype,E.(1, 112) = 1.552, J.l=.216;testpresentation,E.(1, 112) = .792, (l= 
.376. In addition to this, there interaction between slide type and test presentation 
was not significant, E(1, 112) = 2.027, ll = .157. 
I 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
During the present study there were three hypotheses, the experimental 
hypothesis, the misinformation acceptance hypothesis (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 
1985) as well as the explanation formulated by 8ekerian and Bowers (1983). Each 
of these hypotheses made different predictions regarding the pattern of results that 
would be obtained during this study. The results obtained by the present study did 
not conform exactly to the predictions of any of these hypotheses. A description of 
the results is given below. A comparison of these results with the predictions made 
by each of the three hypotheses is also presented. 
Results From The Analyses 
As the present study was concerned with ascertaining under which conditions 
misinformation effects would occur, analyses regarding participants' critical (i.e., 
misled and control) item performance were the main focus. In addition to this an 
analysis of participants' non critical item performance was also conducted. 
However, as this relates more to general memol)l performance than a 
misinformation effect per se (i.e., no postevent information regarding the non 
critical items was provided), it will be discussed later on in this chapter (see the 
section which discusses the experimental hypothesis). Participants' critical item 
performance was subjected to two types of analysis. The first of these was a 
loglinear analysis, during which a model of the significant associations between slide 
type, test presentation and recognition difference (i.e., misled item performance 
subtracted from misled item performance) was constructed using statistical criteria 
to eliminate effects which did not increase its predictive power. The second type of 
analysis consisted of a series of one sample t tests which were conducted upon each of 
the four cells' recognition difference scores. The distinguishing feature between 
these analyses was the amount of detail they covered.1ithe ~glinear analysis looked at 
all of the four cells' data together, and therefore provided an overall analysis of this 
data. The t tests, on the other hand, were much more specific, focusing upon the 
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effect each of the [our combinations of slide type and test presentation had upon 
participants' recognition difference scores. As the results from the overall and 
specific analyses were not consistent (i.e., one set of results contradicted the other) 
with one another, both sets of results are discussed below. 
Overall Analysis The loglinear analysis attempted to construct a model from 
the associations between slide type, test presentation and recognition difference. The 
purpose of this analysis was to provide a model with the simplest combination of 
effects, which still possessed sufficient explanatory power (Farnhill, 1993; 
Norusis, 1990; Tabachnick and Fidel!, 1996). Non significant effects (i.e., main 
and interaction effects) which did not contribute to the model's predictive abilities 
were deleted from the model. In the present study, neither the three way interaction 
(slide type x test presentation x recognition difference) or any of the two way 
interactions (slide type x recognition difference; test presentation x recognition 
difference) 16 added significantly to the model's predictive abilities. Furthermore, 
out of the main effects, slide type and test presentation did not make a significant 
contribution to the model. Thus, the only effect which was found to be significant 
using loglinear analysis was the difference between participants' control and misled 
item performance (i.e., recognition difference). As the overall analysis suggested 
that recognition difference scores were unaffected by either slide type or test 
presentation, it was concluded that misinformation effects (i.e., poorer misled than 
control performance) were distributed equally throughout the four cells. 
Specific Analysis In order to determine if the results from the loglinear 
analysis were reliable, a series of one sample ttestswereconducteduponeachofthe 
four cells' recognition difference scores. The recognition difference scores were 
compared to a test value of zero, with scores which were higher than this value being 
16 One other two way interaction, slide type and test presentation was also found to 
be non significant. However, as this relationship was based upon the assignment of 
participants to each of the four cells, it was not of theoretical interest. 
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interpreted as evidence of a misinformation effect. Based on the pattern of results 
obtained during the loglinear analysis, it was expected that each of the four cells 
would display misinformation effects. The descriptive statistics (see Table 1) 
indicated each of the four cells' scores were in a direction consistent with a 
misinformation effect (i.e., higher control than misled item performance). 
However, the results from the ! tests indicated that only one of the cells, the linear-
random group, displayed a misinformation effect. The other three cells (i.e., linear-
sequential, non linear-sequential, non linear-random) did not display recognition 
difference scores which were significantly higher than zero, although in the non 
linear-random cell, this effect was only marginally non significant, ;(27) = 1.996, 
11 = .056. The detection of a misinformation effect in only one of the cells was 
clearly inconsistent with the loglinear analysis, as this suggested participants' 
recognition difference scores were not equally distributed amongst the four cells. 
The following discussion now attempts to apply the results of these analyses to each 
of the three hypotheses. 
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985): Misinformation Effects Irrespective of Sequential 
Testing 
McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) misinformation acceptance hypothesis 
argued against any form of memory impairment. Rather, these authors contended 
that response biases (i.e., deliberation, non retention) caused by the use of a test in 
which the postevent item was present (i.e., the standard test) were the processes 
underlying misinformation effects. Bekerian and Bowers' (1983; Bowers & 
Bekerian, 1984) findings indicated that participants who received sequential test 
presentation did not report a significant misled-control difference. Clearly, such 
findings were at odds with the misinformation acceptance hypothesis, as sequential 
testing could not have been expected to reduce response biases caused by non 
retention and demand deliberation. This was acknowledged by McCloskey and 
Zaragoza (1985) who claimed that "when the original test procedure is used, poorer 
misled than control performance is expected ... This prediction applies to sequential 
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as well as random tests" (p. 13). To resolve this issue, McCloskey and Zaragoza 
(1985) replicated Bekerian and Bowers' (1983) study and found misinformation 
effects amongst both the random and sequential conditions. This led them to conclude 
that Bekerian and Bowers' (1983) results were "anomalous" (p. 13), as sequential 
presentation did not affect the influence of inconsistent postevent information. 
In terms of the present study, the misinformation acceptance hypothesis 
would predict that each of the four cells would experience misinformation effects. 
From this perspective, neither sequential testing, or the factor expected to mediate 
this effect (i.e., slide linearity) 17 would have been expected to influence 
misinformation effects. The results of the loglinear analysis are certainly consistent 
with these predictions, as recognition difference was the only effect which 
contributed significantly to the model's predictive power. As none of the interactions 
were found to be significant, McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) prediction that 
participants exposed to a standard test (as was the case in the present study) would 
experience a misinfonmation effect, irrespective of test presentation, seems to have 
been supported. However, caution must be exercised in accepting this explanation, 
as the results from the specific analysis did not conform to this prediction. That is, 
the finding that a misinformation effect was restricted solely to the linear-random 
cell contradicts McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) position, as it suggests that 
misled-control differences were not spread uniformly throughout the sample. 
As can be seen, a clear evaluation of McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) 
hypothesis was impeded by the two sets of conflicting results obtained during the 
present study. The overall analysis supported the misinfonmation acceptance 
hypothesis, whereas the specific analyses were at odds with the predictions made by 
this explanation. Therefore, the decision to accept or reject McCloskey and 
17 The expectation that slide linearity would influence test presentation was in fact 
unique to the experimental hypothesis. 
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Zaragoza's (1985) hypothesis rested on determining which of these two sets of 
findings were the most appropriate basis for forming a conclusion. 
As was discussed in the results section, the use of specific comparisons (i.e., 
one sample l tests) without a significant interaction effect is a controversial 
technique (Howell, 1997) However, Howell (1997) has attacked the logic of this 
argument by suggesting that as the tests used for specific comparisons were 
developed without the consideration of overall tests, this criticism is invalid. Howell 
(1997) went on to suggest that in some cases the reliance upon a significant overall 
result may be counter-productive, as in cases where effect sizes are small, overall 
tests may lack the specificity to detect significant effects. Bearing this in mind, the 
specific analyses possessed a distinct advantage. That is, by focusing upon each 
separate cell, a greater indication of the effects both slide type and test presentation 
had upon the magnitude of misled-control differences would be given. It was 
reasoned that as each of the cells represented one of the four possible combinations of 
slide type and test presentation, analysis which focused upon each of these separately 
would give a much more detailed account than an overall analysis which observed 
only general effects. Another argument in favour of the use of specific comparisons 
was that these were used by McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) themselves. Rather 
than using an ANOVA (i.e., McCloskey and Zaragoza, 1985 used four critical items 
allowing the use of a parametric test) McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) used two 
independent sample ttests 18. These were used to compare misled and control ~em 
performance separately for both the random and sequential test conditions. Thus, the 
use of specific rather than overall analysis was not restricted to the present study. 
18 As McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) had both a larger sample (i.e., 168 
participants) and fewer variables (test presentation x ~em type) than the present 
investigation, they had enough participants in each cell (i.e., 42) to compare misled 
and control performance directly. This was not the case with the present study (i.e., 
28 per cell), hence the one sample t tests. 
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As the one sample t tests possessed better power, and were consistent with previous 
research {e.g., McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985) it was decided to interpret these 
results rather than those provided by the overall analysis. This decision resulted in 
McCloskey and Zaragoza's {1985) conclusion being rejected, for as has already been 
discussed, this pattern of results was inconsistent with predictions made by these 
researchers. 
The Experimental Hypothesis: Test Presentation Is Mediated By Slide Linearity 
Unlike McCloskey and Zaragoza's {1985) hypothesis, the experimental 
hypothesis attributed misinformation effects to memory impairment which was 
believed to occur at the time of retrieval {cf. Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; 
Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983). According to such coexistence accounts, the 
introduction of inconsistent postevent information creates an additional memcry 
representation which reduces the accessibility of the original item. This results in 
participants selecting the postevent item at the time of testing. The notion that both 
the postevent and the original item could coexist in memory,led researchers {e.g., 
Belli, 1989; Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983) to manipulate experimental conditions 
in an attempt to increase the accessibility, and hence the retrieval of the original 
memcry. One particular condition that was believed to produce such an effect was 
that of sequential testing {Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; Bowers & Bekerian, 1984 ). 
It was reasoned that by testing participants in a sequential rather than random 
fashion {as had been the case with previous research), the testing conditions would 
match those present during the encoding of the original memory. This resulted in a 
reinstatement of the encoding context {Tulving & Thompson, 1973), which in turn 
led to the original item being more accessible. When random test presentation was 
used, the context present during encoding was not reinstated, hence the postevent 
item was more likely to retrieved. 
One barrier to the acceptance of this conclusion was that McCloskey and 
Zaragoza {1985) had failed to detect an effect of sequential testing. However, the 
fact that McCloskey and Zaragoza {1985) did not use the same stimulus materials as 
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Bekerian and Bowers (1 983) may have influenced results. It was reasoned that 
thematic cues were required to be present amongst the slides, otherwise no effect of 
context reinstatement would occur. That is, thematic cues were believed to be the 
feature present during encoding that were reinstated during retrieval via sequential 
testing. From this perspective, the apparent lack of thematic content (i.e., non 
linearity) present amongst McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1 985) slides would have 
resulted in sequential testing having a negligible effect. This possibility led to 
formulation of the experimental hypothesis which predicted an interaction between 
slide type, test presentation and item type. According to this hypothesis, the effect of 
sequential testing was expected only to become salient amongst conditions in which 
the initial encoding conditions provided global information which could be reinstated 
by sequential testing. If such conditions were not present during the time of encoding 
(i.e., the non linear conditions), there would be no benefit of sequential testing. In 
terms of the specific comparisons, as the linear-sequential group were the only 
participants who were exposed to conditions which allowed sequential testing to have 
an effect upon the retrieval of the original memory (i.e., linear slides), this was the 
only cell which was expected to display no significant difference between misled and 
control item performance. As the other three cells (i.e., linear-random, non 
linear-sequential, non linear-random) received conditions which were not 
conducive to the retrieval of the original item, they were expected to experience 
significant misinformation effects. 
The results from the t tests produced a pattern which was not entirely 
consistent with these predictions. The results from the cells in the linear condition 
were congruent with predictions made by the experimental hypothesis. That is, a 
misinformation effect was found in the linear-random cell and was absent from the 
linear-sequential cell. However, in stark contrast to predictions made by this 
hypothesis, both of the non linear cells failed to display a misinformation effect, 
although in the case of the non linear-random cell this was only marginally the case. 
This finding could not be explained by the experimental hypothesis as the non linear 
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conditions were expected to experience misinformation effects (irrespective of the 
type of test presentation). A further irregularity found in the non linear condition 
was that the two non linear cells' mean recognition difference scores (see Table 1) 
were either equal to or superior to the linear-sequential cell (i.e., all three cells 
performed above chance). If the experimental hypothesis was correct, the scores in 
the non linear cells should have been equal to the linear-random (i.e., below chance) 
rather than the linear-sequential cell. 
Failure to find misinformation effects amongst the non linear cells was 
clearly inconsistent with the experimental hypothesis. It could be suggested that the 
reason for these results was that the item type manipulation (i.e., neutral vs. 
inconsistent postevent information) did not work, which in turn resulted in a 
decreased tendency to detect a misinfonmation effect. However, the fact that a 
misinformation effect was detected in the linear-random cell provided evidence that 
the item type manipulation did indeed work 19. Therefore, this explanation was ruled 
Out 
Having established that the item type manipulation had some effect, an 
explanation as to why the results from the present study did net confonm to the 
experimental hypothesis was suggested. This proposed that the different slide 
·conditions may have influenced results in a manner that was not intended. 
Specifically, concerns regarding the suitability of random event slide presentation 
(i.e., amongst the non linear condition) as a substitute for McCloskey and Zaragoza's 
(1 98S) slides were raised. According to this explanation, the random nature of the 
slides presented to the non linear cells during the €•nco<ling phase caused participants 
to pay increased attention to the slides. That is, the fact that the slides did not have a 
coherent sequence motivated participants to 'work out what was going on'. This 
19The fact that one misinformation effect was detected amongst the four cell, does not 
rule out the possibility of a weak effect size contributing to the results. This is 
discussed in greater detail in the preceding section. 
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motivation resulted in increased attention (such attention is hereafter referred to as 
effortful encoding) amongst these participants, resulting in more material being 
encoded. Conversely, the exposure of the linear cells to sequential presentation 
would have encouraged a more passive style of encoding (hereafter called passive 
encoding), as the sequence of events would not have caused participants to pay extra 
attention to the slides. This could explain why the two non linear cells failed to 
display misinformation effects. That is, the greater attention paid during the 
encoding phase resulted in better overall memory performance, which in turn meant 
that these participants were less likely to be influenced by postevent information. 
As participants in the linear cells adopted a passive encoding style, their memories 
were less detailed and thus more susceptible to inconsistent misinformation. Such a 
conclusion is consistent with previous research that suggests that when memories 
are relatively weak they are more susceptible to the effects of inconsistent 
postevent information (Chandler, 1 989; Payne et al., 1994 ). 
An application of the effortful encoding hypothesis to participants' critical 
item performance indicated that this could provide a satisfactory explanation. Of 
particular interest was the ability of this explanation to account for the fact that a 
sequential testing effect was found amongst the linear cells (i.e., a misinformation 
effect found in the random cell and was not found in the sequential cell), yet was 
absent from the non linear condition (i.e., neither cell displayed a misinformation 
effect). The failure to detect an effect of test presentation amongst the non linear 
condition can be attributed to a ceiling effect caused by participants' effortful 
encoding strategy. That is, the increased attention caused by the random event 
presentation meant that participants' memories were already strong, making 
retrieval easier which in turn made the effect of sequential testing redundant. 
Conversely, the passive encoding strategy adopted by participants in the linear 
condition resulted in weaker memories. This meant that they were less likely to be 
spontaneously retieved, hence the benefit of sequential testing that was found amongst 
these two cells. 
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A interpretation that was similar to the effortful encoding hypothesis was 
used by Murachver et al. (1996) to account for the relationship they detected 
between encoding and retrieval strategies. During this study, participants were 
exposed to one of three encoding conditions: (a) direct participation in an event 
(direct experience), (b) they witnessed another participant perform the event 
(witness) (c) they were told a story about the event (story). These three conditions 
were then assigned to one of two retrieval conditions, either (a) acting out the event 
(acting out), or (b) providing a verbal description of the event (verbal recall). A 
main effect of encoding strategy was located. This suggested that recall accuracy 
increased as a function of the level of participation (i.e., direct experience was 
highest, the witness group was second, the story group was last). An interaction 
between encoding and retrieval strategies was also detected. In a manner that was 
consistent with the encoding specificity principle (cf. Tulving & Thompson, 1973) 
both the story and witness groups reported an effect of context reinstatement. That 
is, recall accuracy was highest when the encoding and retrieval conditions were 
similar (i.e., acting out was most effective for the witness group, whereas verbal 
recall was more effective for the story group). Interestingly, the direct experience 
group displayed no benefit of context reinstatement. In this condition, recall 
accuracy was equally high for both the cells regardless of the nature of retrieval. 
This finding led Murachver et al. (1996) to conclude that when encoding conditions 
are optimal, the effect of context reinstatement will be negligible, the implication 
being, that if memories are initially encoded well they will not benefit from 
retrieval support. Whilst the Murachver et al. (1996) study differed from the 
present study's methodology in many respects (e.g., using children instead of adults, 
overall accuracy rather than a misinformation effect was measured, the encoding and 
retrieval conditions differed etc.), the fact that the Murachver et al. (1996) 
interpretation was similar to the effortful encoding hypothesis seemed to bear 
testimony to the accuracy of this explanation. 
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Whilst the effortful encoding hypothesis could account for the results of the 
critical item analysis, it was necessary to determine if this explanation extended to 
participants' non critical item performance. If effortful encoding was reasoned to 
boost overall memory performance by increasing participants' attention, any 
benefits that were found in terms of critical item performance should also have 
extended to non critical item performance. An examination of the descriptive 
statistics (see Table 3) suggested that this was not the case. This revealed that one of 
the linear cells reported the highest score and one of the non linear cells displayed 
the lowest score. However, the results of an ANOVA conducted upon these non critical 
item scores suggested that these differences were not significant. The failure to find 
significantly higher non linear than linear non critical item performance may have 
been because many of the details that were manipulated to create these test pairs (see 
Method) were exceedingly small (e.g., a tap on the ground) and peripheral. In 
comparison, the critical items (e.g., a car and a road sign) took up large amounts of 
the visual field. That is, as non critical items were small they were unlikely to be 
noticed, even if people were paying attention. Thus, on the basis that non critical 
item performance was not a particularly good indicator of participants' overall 
memory20, there remained no reliable way of testing the effortful encoding 
hypothesis. Therefore, the possibility that random event presentation of Bekerian 
and Bowers' (1983) slides simply were not analogous to non linear slides could not 
be ruled out. This meant that although the present results did not support the 
experimental hypothesis, this explanation could not be rejected outright. 
Bekerjan and Bowers (1983); An Effect Of Test Presentation Regardless of 
Slide Linearity 
20 Support for the notion that non critical item performance is a poor indicator of 
overall memory, can be found in that none of these authors that have used the same 
set of slides as Bekerian and Bowers (1983) (e.g., Bowers & 8ekerian, 1984; 
Loftus, 1977; Loftus et al., 1978) have analysed non critical item performance. 
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Another alternative to the explanation discussed above related to Bekerian and 
Bowers' ( 1983) hypothesis. This hypothesis was similar to the experimental 
hypothesis in that it predicted an effect of sequential testing. However, unlike the 
experimental hypothesis, Bekerian and Bowers' (1983) explanation was far more 
general regarding the effects of sequential testing. Whereas the experimental 
hypothesis predicted that the effect of sequential testing upon misinformation effects 
would be mediated by slide linearity, Bekerian and Bowers (1983) proposed that 
sequential test presentation would reduce the deleterious effects of inconsistent 
postevent information irrespective of slide linearity. From this perspective, both of 
the cells which received sequential testing (i.e., linear-sequential, non linear-
sequential) would receive conditions that were similar to those under which the 
memory was encoded. This would result in greater accessibility to the original item, 
and therefore no significant misinformation effect would be detected in these cells. 
Conversely, participants in the cells which received random testing (i.e., linear-
random, non linear-random) would receive conditions that did not match those under 
which the original item was encoded, therefore the retrieval of the postevent item 
was more likely. This would result in a misinformation effect for these two cells. 
The results from the comparisons conducted amongst the four cells revealed 
one misinformation effect (i.e., linear-random cell) and one potential 
misinformation effect (i.e., non linear-random cell) were present. Clearly, as both 
of these effects occurred within the cells which received random testing, this trend 
was consistent with the Bekerian and Bowers (1983) predictions. That is, 
misinformation effects were contingent upon test presentation, regardless of slide 
linearity. 
The evidence for Bekerian and Bowers' (1983) hypothesis became even more 
convincing when the possibility that the marginally non significant result detected 
amongst the non linear-random cell may have in fact been significant was considered. 
Up until now, the discussion of results has assumed that a true misinformation effect 
was not found amongst this condition. However, it is possible that the failure to find 
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a significant effect was due to the analysis lacking power. That is, the t test 
conducted upon the non linear-random cell may have lacked sensitivity and therefore 
avoided detecting a misinformation effect. As was reported in the results section, the 
power analysis suggested that the t tests used for the specific analyses possessed 
sufficient power (72%) to detect a moderate (i.e., 0.5) effect size. Therefore, as 
calculations were conducted using a moderate effect size as an estimate, such power 
would only be acceptable if the effect size in the present study was either equal to or 
greater than 0.5. Data from previous research provide the means by which 
calculations of effect size are based (Cohen, 1990, 1992; Howell, 1997). 
Unfortunately, the previous research which was concerned with sequential test 
effects (i.e., Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; Bowers & Bekerian, 1984; McCloskey & 
Zaragoza, 1985) did not report enough information to allow such a calculation to be 
conducted. As an indication of effect size was not ascertained, this meant that it was 
unclear if a moderate effect size was indeed present. If the effect size was in fact 
smaller than 0.5, the l tests would have become more conservative. Bearing this in 
mind, the non significant result detected amongst the non linear·random cell may 
have been because the misinformation effect in this cell was smaller than expected, 
thereby resulting in the l test to fail detecting such an effect21. Furthermore, a 
small effect size could have accounted for the discrepancy between the overall and 
specific analyses. That is, as overall analyses are less powerful at detecting 
interaction effects in relation to specific analyses (Howell, 1997), a smaller effect 
21 One possible reason for a small effect size may have been due to the addition of a 
new critical item (i.e., the car). That is, participants' memory for this item may 
not have been susceptible to inconsistent postevent information, thereby reducing 
the misinformation effect. A pilot experiment suggested that this item was 
susceptible to misinformation. However, as the present critical items can not be 
analysed (i.e., there would be an unsatisfactory number of cases in each cell to 
permit an analysis), this possibility can not be ruled out. 
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size would further reduce the power of the overall analysis, hence the discrepancy. 
Whilst such arguments may sound convincing, as the previous research could not 
give an indication of effect size, they must be accepted with caution. This means that 
in relation to Bekerian and Bowers' (19B3) hypothesis, results can only be said to 
conform to a 'trend' (i.e., one significant and one marginally non significant 
misinformation effect was found in the random condition) which is consistent with 
the pattern identified by these researchers. 
Concluding Remarks: 
The results from the present study made the drawing of firm conclusions 
problematic. Interpretation was confounded by the two sets of analyses (i.e., overall 
and specific) reporting conflicting patterns of results. In keeping with McCloskey 
and Zaragoza's (1985) expectations, the overall analysis suggested that there was no 
effect of sequential testing. Contrary to this finding, the specific analyses revealed 
that although each cells' recognition difference scores were in a direction consistent 
with a misinformation effect, in only one cell, (i.e., linear-random) did this 
difference achieve significance. However, one other cell, the non linear-random 
cell, only just failed to report a significant misinformation effect. One possible 
explanation for these conflicting results, is that the effect of slide type and test 
presentation were extremely small and therefore less likely to be detected by the 
more conservative overall analysis (Howell, 1997). 
Bearing this in mind, it was decided to focus upon the results from the 
specific analysis, as these tests possessed greater power, and thus were more likely 
to detect a small effect size. It quickly became apparent that these results were not 
consistent with McCloskey and Zaragoza's (19B5) predictions that sequential testing 
had no effect upon misinformation effects. If this had of been the case, all four cells 
should have experienced misinformation effects. These results were believed to 
provide some support for Bekerian and Bowers (19B3)hypothesis. These 
researchers expected an effect of sequential testing upon misinformation effects 
regardless of slide linearity. This explanation was particularly convincing if one is 
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willing to accept the position that a small effect size may have hindered the specific 
analyses' ability to detect a misinformation effect in the non linear-random cell. Had 
this been the case, this would have meant that both conditions would have experienced 
misinformation effects whilst the sequential conditions avoided such an effect. This 
pattern ot results would have been entirely consistent with 8ekerian and Bowers' 
(1983) account. 
However, it would be premature to dismiss the experimental hypothesis as 
the non linearity slide manipulation did not appear to produce this effect. If 
anything, it may have encouraged effortful encoding, thereby boosting participants' 
critical item performance. However, a barrier to this explanation was that analysis 
of non critical item performance failed to reflect the same pattern of results obtained 
by the critical item performance. However, as differences between the non critical 
item pairs consisted of small perceptual details, this form of analysis was unlikely 
to offer any great insight into participants' memories. This meant that it was 
unlikely to be a valid method for determining whether or not effortful encoding 
occurred. 
As this conflict is at present irreconcilable, it may be more productive to 
focus upon the conclusions that can be formed from this study. By focusing upon the 
two linear cells, it appears that some effect of sequential testing was found. Thus, 
whilst the potential bias of 'effortful encoding' did not allow precedence to be given to 
either Bekerian and Bowers' (1983) or the experimental hypothesis, it did suggest 
that some effect of sequential testing occurred. Thus, amongst these two cells it can 
be said that sequential testing helped boost participants' memory performance. The 
implication is that this increase was due to context reinstatement. That is, by testing 
participants in a sequential fashion, thematic cues that were present during encoding 
were also available at the time of testing, thereby resulting in the original item 
being accessed. Convers"iy. participants who were exposed to random testing did not 
receive a reinstatement of these thematic cues. Subsequently, they were more likely 
to access the postevent item at the time of retrieval. 
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This finding has larger implications for the misinformation effect research. 
An effect of sequential testing implies that misinformation affects coexistence based 
memory impairment. From a coexistence perspective, the introduction of 
inconsistent postevent information is reasoned to create an additional memory 
representation (i.e., the pcstevent item) which exists along with the original 
memory, resulting in this original item becoming less accessible. This finding is 
clearly at odds with the alteration hypothesis (Loftus, 1979b; Loftus & Loftus, 
1980), as well as the misinformation acceptance hypothesis (McCloskey & Zoragoza, 
1985), as neither of these explanations can explain the ability of a test procedure to 
override the effects of inconsistent postevent information under standard test 
conditions. The present study attempted to reconcile the conflicting results obtained 
by 8ekerian and Bowers (1983) and McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985). The present 
results could not resolve this discrepancy, although they did suggest that some effect 
of sequential testing upcn misinformation effects was obtained. As such, these 
results suggest that McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) dismissal of their rivals 
claims were premature. Given the interest in reconciling this discrepancy, the 
experimental hypothesis warrants further testing (albeit with a refined procedure). 
By increasing the sample size, the analysis would have a better chance of detecting 
what may be a small effect size. Furthermore, by develt'ping sets of both linear and 
non linear slides, the pvtential bias of effortful encoding could be avoided. It is 
reasoned that by implementing these changes, a more precise conclusio~ regarding 
the association between slide linearity, test presentation and the misinformation 
effect would be provided. 
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Appendix A 
The following section contains the test booklet. It is worth noting that several 
features of this booklet differ from that used in the experiment. Firstly, the filler 
tasks also contained a crossword. However, this was unable to be reproduced in the 
Appendix. Secondly, the questionnaire within this appendix contains all of the 
possible variations on the postevent questions. For example, the question relating to 
the road sign critical item, contains both of the postevent alternatives (i.e., stop 
sign, giveway sign), as well as its neutral form (i.e., road sign). In the experiment, 
according to counterbalancing procedures (whether the item was as a control or 
misled item, as well as the items participants saw during phase one), participants 
were only ever given one alternative. The first page of the test booklet can be found 
overleaf. 
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INFORMED CONSENT 
The experiment in which you are about to participate is designed to investigate 
the reliability of eyewitness testimony. It is being conducted by John Jones, under 
the supervision of Dr. Susan Gee, as part of his requirement for the fourth year 
Bachelor of Psychology (Honours) course. The experiment conforms to guidelines 
produced by the Edith Cowan University Committee for the Conduct of Ethical 
Research. 
In this experiment you will be required to view a set of slides, complete two 
simple exercises, read a short statement and complete a memory test. The test 
requires you to nominate the items you saw in the slides from two alternatives, one of 
which was present in the slides, and one of which was not. Do not worry if you have 
not done this before as most of the other participants are identical to you in this 
respect. The aim of this experiment is to evaluate if various visual and verbal modes 
of presentation can aid memory. This research will hopefully lead to the development 
of more effective eyewitness questioning procedures. 
At no time will your name be reported. All data will be reported in group 
form only. At the conclusion of the study, a report of the results will be available 
upon request. 
Please understand that your participation in this research is tol'ally voluntary 
and you are free to withdraw at any time during this study without penal·cy, and to 
remove any data that you may have contributed. 
Any questions concerning this project can be directed to either myself (OB) 
9405 1151 or my supervisor, Dr. Susan Gee at the School of Psychology on (OB) 
9400 5526. 
I (the participant) have read the information above and any questions I have asked 
have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate in this activity, 
realising that I may withdraw at any time. I agree that research data may be 
published, provided I am not identifiable. 
Participant 
Researcher 
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Please place your age and gender in the appropriate spaces below, 
and begin to work through the questions below. When you have 
finished this page, please turn over the page. However, after 
finishing the exercises over the page, do not go any further until 
instructed. 
Age ____ _ Gender _____ _ 
(1) Nine identical packages, each containing one of Mr. Brown's new scalp massaging 
inventions, had been loaded onto the train. The train was ready to depart when the 
frantic Brown came running along the platform. "Hold the train" he yelled, "one of 
my devices is missing its fringe-equaliser. Without it the whole thing might melt 
when the customer tries to use it." 
"Well you better find it quick, we leave in two minutes" said the guard. There was no 
time to unwrap the packages, but Brown had brought with him a set of scales which 
would allow him to compare the weights of the parcels against each other. The parcel 
that was slightly lighter would be the one without the fringe equaliser. 
Unfortunately there was only time for two weighings. How could Brown be sure he 
found the right parcel? 
(2) This is Angela's first time in a three mile fun run, and she is finding it a little 
tough. In fact she has only just completed the first two miles, and as she looks at her 
watch and says to herself breathlessly, " I'm only averaging four miles an hour. Oh 
dear, I wanted to average six miles an hour for this run- I must go a bit faster." 
How fast will she have to run the final mile in order to get her average speed for the 
whole Fun run up to six miles per hour? 
(3) Pete's Pizza Pantry has been a rip roaring success so far. "We prize ourselves 
on our amazingly speedy service," says Pete who likes to take a stopwatch to his 
hardworking staff as they slave over the grills. He started off with three pizza 
makers, who could produce in total, three pizzas in three minutes. Now business is 
booming and he's doubling his staff to six pizza makers. How long will it take them to 
produce six pizzas? 
(4) Standing in the street in front of a shop window, I can see the name of the shop, 
in large gilt letters on the window itself, and I can also see it reflected in a mirror 
inside the shop. Do I see the name on the mirror the right way round, or reversed? 
AFTER COMPLETING THESE EXERCISES, PLEASE TURN OVER 
\ 
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(S) The leopard and the cheetah wanted to find out which of them could run the 
quickest. "That little stream is 1 00 paces away, I'll race you to it," said the cheetah. 
Off they ran, and the cheetah was ten paces ahead of the leopard when she sprang 
over the stream. "I'm too fast for you," said the cheetah. "I'll tell you what, let's do 
that race again, but this time you start from the same place, and I will start ten 
paces behind you." The leopard agreed, and they ran the race again at exactly the same 
speeds. Who won this time? 
NB: Crossword inserted and photocopied 
PLEASE DO NOT TURN OVER UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
INSTRUCTIONS 
The following 20 questions refer to the events you saw in the 
slides. Circle the response which is consistent with what you 
remember. As these questions will be assessed for accuracy it is 
important that you try very hard to remember the events in the 
slides, as well as answering all of the questions. Throughout this 
questionnaire, the person who was struck by the red Datsun is 
referred to as the pedestria'l~ whereas the person accompanying 
the pedestrian is known as the companion. Furthermore, the term 
driver is used to refer to the person who drove the red Datsun 
which ran over the pedestrian. 
QUESTIONS 
( 1) Can you recall if the driver was wearing glasses at the time 
he stepped out of the red Datsun? YES NO 
(2) Was the companion resting against a light pole when the 
pedestrian was struck by the red Datsun? YES NO 
(3) Do you remember anyone (e.g., the companion, driver or police 
officer) moving the pedestrian from the roadside at any stage 
after the pedestrian was run over? YES NO 
(4) Was the companion wearing a hat? YES NO 
(5) Did the driver pass anyone whilst he was running away from 
the scene of the crime? YES NO 
(6) Was the car the police officer arrived in white? YES NO 
(7) Did the surface of the road upon which the accident occurred 
appear to be dry? YES NO 
AfTER YOU HAVE FINISHED QUESTION 7, PLEASE TURN 
OVER THE PAGE 
Sequential Presentation 8 1 
(8) Was the companion wearing a yellow striped shirt? 
YES NO 
(9) Do you recall if, at any stage, the police officer used his radio 
to summon help? YES NO 
( 1 0) When you saw the driver emerge from the red Datsun, do you 
remember if there was someone else sitting in the vehicle? 
YES NO 
( 11 ) Was the pedestrian struck at a pedestrian crossing (denoted 
by two white lines)? YES NO 
(12) Circle 'yes' if you remember the driver having a beard. 
YES NO 
( 13) Was anyone leaning out of the green car I yellow car I car 
that passed the accident scene? YES NO 
( 14) Did the driver bend over and touch the pedestrian when he 
was on the road? YES NO 
(15) Was the companion looking in the pedestrian's direction at 
the moment he was hit by the red Datsun? YES NO 
(16) Circle 'yes' if you believe the pedestrian was wearing a long 
sleeved shirt. YES NO 
( 17) Did a pedestrian walk in front of the red Datsun when it 
stopped at the stoplgivewaylroad sign? YES NO 
( 18) Did the pedestrian look to his left before crossing the road? 
YES NO 
( 19) Circle 'yes' if you think the red Datsun was a convertible. 
YES NO 
(20) Did the pedestrian have black hair? YES NO 
AFTER COMPLETING THIS EXERCISE, PLEASE DO THE TASK OVER THE 
PAGE 
I 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
Please work through the examples below, when you have finished 
the examples on this page, complete the exercises on the next 
page. However, after completing these, please do not go any 
further until instructed to. 
(1) "My people are not being polite enough,'' declared King Ogbad the Genteel to his 
courtiers. "By royal decree, all people must now shake hands more often. To make 
sure that this is carried out, I order you to count how many times each person shakes 
hands with another in the next year. And should your answers be even the slightest 
bit wrong, off with your heads!" he bellowed. And so that year, the courtiers 
journeyed throughout the land. Determined to record every handshake, they worked 
diligently throughout the day and often late into the night. At the end of the year the 
chief courtier was summoned to the king to announce the results. "Sire, every 
greeting has been witnessed, every secret liaison has been spied, and every 
handshake has been recorded." Pointing to the vast stacks of paper piled to the palace 
ceiling he announced "Here are the results which have taken several weeks to count. 
And the grand total was ... " 
"Silence" ordered the king. ''Tell me first, how many people shook hands an odd 
number of times?" "Well let me see ... it was 2143''. replied the courtier after he 
had looked through his summary. "Then you have miscounted!" roared King Ogbad. 
"Off with your heads the lot off you!" 
How could the king be so certain that the counting was wrong? 
(2)Scruffy Sam has put on his T-shirt. Unfortunately it is inside out and back to 
front. Normally the washing label is on the inside of his left sleeve. Where is ;t now? 
(3) TI;e famous archaeologist Professor von Spitzbender was looking at some 
interesting old carvings on a cave wall. "Mmm, zis appears to be a diagram of a 
pyramid," he said. "Let me study it through my magnifying glass." 
The magnifying glass makes all of the sides of the pyramid appear three times as 
long. "Aha, zis corner of ze pyramid appears to be exactly 60 degrees," said the 
Professor. What is the angle of the corner before magnification? 
( 4) "So Mister Bond, now that I have shown you how I plan to take aver the world, it 
is time for me to put you to a slow and agonising death. I have stripped you of your 
shirt and tied you so you can not move. I am going to seal you into this airtight 
chamber, with barely enough room to swing a cat. It is so well insulated that no heat 
can enter or leave it. In the chamber you will notice I have left a large kitchen 
freezer with the door jammed open! Already the chamber is only five degrees 
Centigrade. Goodbye and say your prayers ... Mr Bond". 
How long do you think James has to manufacture his escape before he freezes to death: 
minutes, days, or hours? 
Wlill:l YOU HAVE FINISHED, PLEASe TURN OVER, 
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(5) Jane Higgins was walking down the road when she bumped into an old friend. 
"Hello, I haven't seen or heard from you since graduation back in 1982!" said Jane, 
"What's happened to you?" 
"Well, I got married in 1989 to somebody you wouldn't know. This is our son," said 
the friend, who was holding hands with a little boy. 
"Hello and what's your name?" said Jane to the boy. 
"It's the same as Daddy's". 
11Ah, so it's Peter is it?" said Jane. 
How did Jane know? 
NB. Crossword inserted here and photocopied 
AFTE~ YOU HAVE FINISHED, PLEASE DO NOT TURN OVER UNTIL 
INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE 
BESPONSE SHEET 
INSTRUCTIONS 
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During the following exercise you will be shown some more 
slides. These will be presented in either single order or in pairs. 
The pairs are made up of one slide you saw previously and one 
which you have never seen. Your task is to indicate which slide 
you saw before in the spaces below. For example, if you think you 
saw the slide that appeared on the left of the pair, place a tick in 
the left hand column. Please make sure you complete each space. 
Pair 1 
Pair2 
Pair3 
Pair 4 
Palr5 
Pair6 
Pair 7 
LEFT RIGHT 
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Appendix B 
Using SPSS For Windows, participants' scores were subjected to a Z x Z (x 
Z) split-plot factorial ANOYA. The between-subjects independent variables were 
slide type (linear vs. non linear) and test presentation (sequential vs. random). The 
accuracy of postevent information served as a within-subjects independent variable, 
with each participant receiving both misled and control items. Overall recognition 
accuracy on both misled and control items served as the dependent variable. The 
categorical nature of the dependent variable would not allow a normal distribution to 
be constructed. However, results from the Levene's test for both misled, .E (3, 11 Z) 
=.916, Jl = .436, and control, .E (3, 11 Z) = 1.090, Jl = .357, items suggested that 
the homogeneity of variance requirement was fulfilled. 
Out of all the main and interaction effects, postevent information was 
significant effect that was detected, .E(1, 112.) = 11.641, Jl = .001. This suggested 
that recognition accuracy was increased as a function of the accuracy of postevent 
information. A summary of the results is presented in Table BZ. 
Table 61 
Results From The ANOYA Regarding Main and Interaction Effects 
Variable(s) 
.E ll 
Postevent 1 11.641 .001 * 
Slide 1 .413 .5S2 
Test 1 .017 .B9B 
Postevent x Slide 1 .S50 .460 
Postevent x Test 1 .550 .460 
Postevent x Slide x Test 1 .022 .BB2 
~ *Jl<.OS 
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Appendix C 
Table C1 
Parameter Estimates Obtained Regarding First. Second and Third Order Effects 
Variable Parameter ~ 
Difference x Slide x Test 
~ 1 x non linear x random -.1 62 -. 784 
0 x non linear x random .141 1.038 
Difference x Slide 
-1 x non linear .038 .185 
0 x non linear .059 .418 
Difference x Test 
-1 x random -.1 73 -.838 
0 x random .068 .482 
Slide x Test 
non linear x random -.067 -.556 
Difference 
- 1 -.897 -4.332 
0 .731 5.199 
Slide 
non linear -.012 -.100 
Test 
random -.055 -.463 
Sequential Presentation 8 7 
Appendix D 
Due to the concern regarding the application of one sample !tests to data 
which was not normally distributed, each of the four cells' control and misled scores 
were subjected to Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tests to see if there was a misinformation 
effect (i.e., significantly lower misled performance relative to control 
performance). Whilst performance on the control items was better than misled item 
performance for each of the four cells, the linear-random group was the only cell in 
which this difference was significant, I = -2.138, Jl = .033. In each of the other 
cells: linear-sequential, :<: =-1. 732, Jl = .083; non linear-random, I =-1.897, Jl = 
.058; and non linear-sequential, I = -.832, Jl = .405; the difference between 
control •.nd misled item performance was not significant. 
I 
